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The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of cohesion level on the 
occurrence of groupthink. Janis's (1982) Groupthink model was utilised as the 
theoretical framework for this research. 
Fifteen subjects participated in the study. Subjects were randomly selected 
from advertisements. They comprised of both males and females. Participants 
were divided into three groups. These groups were created to assess different 
levels of cohesion. Members of group one had an eight month history of 
interactions and were categorised as the High Cohesion Group. The remaining 
subjects were randomly placed in either group two or three respectively. None of 
these subjects had prior interactions and were categorised as the Low Cohesion 
Group and Non Cohesion Group. 
The methodology for this research was of a qualitative nature. It involved the 
application of two questionnaires. The first was the group questionnaire, which 
was designed to determine group cohesiveness. It was aimed at investigating the 
initial cohesiveness of the groups, changes in group cohesion levels, and the 
effect of cohesion on group interaction. The questionnaire was administered a 
total of three times to group one and group two, and once to group three. 
Because the impact of the discussion topic on groupthink was significant for the 
purpose of this study, the groups generated their own discussion topics. This 
allowed subjects to develop topics which were of relevance to them. The second 
questionnaire was administered at the completion of the research. Its objective 
was to determine subjects' familiarity with the topics chosen. 
Data was also collected from the transcripts of videos. This provided an 
indepth group analysis for symptoms of groupthink. The results found that low 
levels of cohesion evoked more groupthink symptoms than did high cohesion 
levels. These findings were in contrast to Janis (1982) Groupthink model. 





As human beings we are social creatures. Throughout our lives, both 
work and play are spent interacting with other people. There are few 
occasions where we do not take part in some form of daily group activity, 
whether it be talking on the telephone or chatting to the postman. 
The relationship of the individual to 'the group' has been a topic of debate 
amongst social scientists for centuries. A reason for this is that group 
participation plays a significant role in the lives of us all. Of interest for the 
present research, is the idea that group action reflects the equal involveq,ent 
of all group members. However, in reality this often is not the case. Take a 
group decision making process, for example. One of the basic functions of 
this process is to decide on a course of action. Although it is assumed that all 
members of the group are equally involved in the group decision process, 
group dynamics heavily influence the likelihood of this occurring. 
Despite an abundance of literature, the process of decision making still 
remains ambiguous. Often attention is drawn to the decision processes of a 
group only after that group has made a badly flawed decision. So why does a 
group make an unsuccessful decision? What group characteristics influence 
decision quality? How does the material under discussion impact on group 
processes? To answer such questions the issue of group dynamics must be 
explored. In particular, we need to know the factors which influence how a 
group makes a decision. 
The literature for the present study will begin with an overview of what a 
group is, and then move on to a discussion of groupthink, one of the most 
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frequently cited theories of faulty decision making. The theory of groupthink 
will be defined and previous research on the topic addressed. The concept of 
cohesion, which is considered a major part of the groupthink theory, will be 
discussed along with some research about it's relevance to groupthink. The 
importance of the issue under discussion by the decision making group will 
be analysed, and the limitations of previous research outlined. Finally the 
rationale for the present study will be presented. 
1.1 WHAT IS A GROUP? 
One of the clearest definitions of the concept of a group, is that of Forsyth 
(1990) who defined it as comprising "two or more interdependent individuals 
who influence one another through social interactions" (Forsyth, 1990, p. 7). 
Turner (1987) defined a psychological group as "one that is psychologically 
significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for 
social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values" (Turner, 1987, 
p.1 ). 
A number of characteristics distinguish a group from a random collection 
of people. Firstly, a group has its own identity, separate from the identity of its 
members (Fisher, 1974). This feature is demonstrated by the nature of some 
groups to continue as an entity, despite changes in their membership. 
Secondly, identification with a group is important for both its members and 
non members (Brilhart, 1967, in Fisher, 1974; Turner, 1987). A third essential 
feature of group membership is communication. Without some form of 
interaction between group members a group cannot exist. Such interactions 
are often tempered by the status of the individuals within the group, as well as 
by the goal of the group (Forsyth, 1990). Fourthly a group is a dynamic entity, 
which changes with time and circumstance. 
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1.1.1 What Are Groups Used For? 
Researchers argue that groups are preferable to individuals for decision 
making purposes. A common explanation for this assumption derives from 
the "two heads are better than one" approach. This view assumes that 
decision quality will be enhanced by the input of more than one person 
(Dunnette et al., 1963; Forsyth, 1990). Stocker-Kreichgauer (1982) argues 
that the collective interests of group members result in an increasingly 
outcome orientated approach to decision making. As a consequence, group 
decision making appears more rational than that of the individual. 
Furthermore group decision making provides a range of experiences and 
skills with which to resolve the problem at hand. By representing a variety of 
individuals the ability of the group to provide a fair and equitable result is 
increased. Burton (1990) suggests that group involvement leads to a greater 
understanding of the outcome of the decision making process (Fisher, 1974; 
Maier, 1967; Stasser, 1991; Wexley & Yuki, 1984). 
Alternatively, the comparison of the group to the individual in the decision 
making process is viewed by some researchers as unnecessary. Although a 
group is not necessarily preferable to an individual, groups are of value for 
some decisions. The nature of the task should determine whether a group or 
individual is chosen (Fisher, 1974). 
Furthermore groups may also fail in the decision making process if group 
membership encourages the group members to take more risks than would 
an individual. This is known as the risky shift phenomenon (Fisher, 1974). In 
addition groups may diffuse responsibility (Fisher, 1974), allowing individuals 
to avoid the blame for failure. 
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Groups are sometimes required to make momentous decisions, and at 
times make errors during the decision making process. Some famous 
examples of situations where a group made a poor decision include the 
space shuttle Challenger launch (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Moorhead, 
Ference & Neck, 1991 ); the Cuban missile crisis (Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987; 
Janis, 1982); the trial of John Delorean (Neck & Moorhead, 1992); the United 
States attempt to rescue hostages in Tehran (Smith, 1984); and the Korean 
War, Pearl Harbour, and the escalation of the Vietnam War (Janis, 1982). 
The unfortunate outcome of the decisions made in each of these cases has 
been linked not to incompetent or stupid people making the decisions, but to 
the processes involved in reaching the decision. 
The decision making procedures used in these examples have been 
critiqued by several authors, including Janis (1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). 
Janis could not understand how groups consisting of intelligent and capable 
people could make the decisions they made with the information they had 
available. He studied some of these poorly made decisions and concluded 
that there were several factors that these decision making groups had in 
common. He then developed a theoretical model he called "Groupthink". 
This model has been a pervasive force in group research, but has found 
limited support. 
1. 2 GROUPTHINK 
Groupthink is a concept which was developed by Janis and has not 
ceased to be a source of controversy. It is a concept which Janis defined in 
1982, and it is this definition which is used here. He referred to 
a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members' 
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1982, p. 9) 
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Groupthink was described by Janis in an attempt to explain why groups 
consisting of intelligent people with appropriate skills and knowledge had 
made errors while making important decisions. Examples of such situations 
were President Truman's advisory group who supported the escalation of the 
Korean War, President Kennedy's group of advisers who supported the Bay 
of Pigs invasion, and the group who advised President Johnson to escalate 
the American involvement in the Vietnam War (Janis & Mann, 1977). 
1.2.1 Janis' Theoretical Analysis Of Groupthink 
Janis (1982; Janis & Mann, 1977) created a model of the groupthink 
theory that contained both antecedent conditions and observable 
consequences. The theoretical model used here ( see Figure 1) is taken from 
Janis (1982). 
1.2.1.1 Antecedent Conditions 
Janis's (1982) theoretical model of groupthink contains three major 
antecedent conditions. The first is that decision makers must constitute a 
cohesive group. Janis (1982) defined cohesion as "The high degree to which 
the members value their membership in the group, and want to continue to be 
affiliated" (Janis, 1982, p. 245). Other definitions of cohesion are discussed at 
length in section 1.3.1. 
6 
The second antecedent condition of groupthink is that the organization 
will contain structural faults. Janis listed four faults. First the insulation of the 
group from external influences reduces the information and feedback 
available to the decision makers. It also prevents non group members from 
having an input in the decision. Secondly a lack of impartial leadership can 
lead to a discussion dominated by the leader, where the leader's opinion 
may be the only one given serious consideration. Often in groups where the 
leader has stated a preferred option there will not be a consideration of any 
other alternative. To consider another option could be considered an attack 
against the status of the group leader. The third structural fault Janis (1982) 
identified was a lack of properly defined procedures against using 
inadequate decision making methods. Fourthly a group may be composed of 
individuals who are so similar that the group may be redundant. 
The third type of antecedent conditions are those which create a 
provocative situational context. They include a situation where the decision 
making group is under high stress to make a decision with few alternative 
solutions to that of the group leader. The stress factor is often a shortage of 
time in which to make an important decision. An example is when President 
Kennedy and his advisers had twenty four hours to make a decision that 
could have precipitated World War Three. Another type of provocative 
situation for groupthink occurs when a group suffers from a temporary loss of 
self esteem. This can be preceded by recent failures of the group, which 
make the group acknowledge its shortcomings. 
Other provocative contexts include excessive difficulties with current 
decision making tasks, and moral dilemmas such as the only available 
solution violating the ethical or moral standards of the group. 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF GROUPTHINK 
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS 
A 




Structural Faults of the 
Organisation 
1. Insulation of the Group 
2. Lack of Tradition of Impartial Leadership 
3. Lack of Norms Requiring Methodical 
Procedures 
4. Homogeniety of Members' Social 






1. High Stress from External Threats with 
Low Hope of a Better Solution than the 
Leader's 
2. Low Self-Esteem Temporarily Induced 
by: 
a. Recent Failures that Make Members' 
Inadequacies Salient 
b. Excesive Difficulties on Current 
Decision-Making Tasks that Lower 
Each Member's Sense of Self-Efficacy 
c. Moral Dilemmas: Apparent Lack of 
Feasible Alternatives Except Ones that 




OBSERV AB1E CONSEQUENCES 
C 
Symptoms of Groupthink 
Type I Overestimation of the Group 
1. illusion of Invulnerability 
2. Belief in Inherent Morality of the Group 
Type II Closed-Mindedness 
3. Collective Rationalisations 
4. Stereotypes of Out-Groups 
Type ill Pressures Toward Uniformity 
5. Self-Censorship 
6. illusion of Unanimity 
7. Direct Pressure on Dissenters 
8. Self-Appointed Mindguards 
> 
D 
Symptoms of Defective 
Decision-Making 
1. Incomplete Survey of Alternatives 
2. Incomplete Survey of Objectives 
3. Failure to Examine Risks of Preferred 
Choice 
4. Failure to Reappraise Initially Rejected 
Alternatives 
5. Poor Information Search 
6. Selective Bias in Processing Information 
at Hand 
7. Failure to Work Out Contingency Plans 
V 
E 
Low Probability of Successful 
Outcome 
Figure 1. Janis' (1982) Theorectical Model of Groupthink. Taken from Janis (1982), P.244 
'-J 
Based on Janis, IL., Mann, L., Decision Making, Copyright ©1977 by The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 
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The presence of these three antecedent conditions within a decision 
making group were considered by Janis (1982) to precede "groupthink". 
However the existence of these conditions did not necessarily condemn the 
group to errors in the decision making process. The existence of one 
antecedent without the others is not enough for groupthink to occur, which is 
why cohesion is considered a "necessary but not sufficient" condition for the 
groupthink phenomenon (Janis, 1982, p. 245). 
1.2.1.2 Observable Consequences Of Groupthink 
The observable consequences of groupthink can further be divided into 
three categories; the symptoms of groupthink, the symptoms of effective 
decision making, and the low probability of a successful outcome. 
1.2.1.2.1 Symptoms Of Groupthink 
Groupthink symptoms are categorised into three types. These are the 
over-estimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward 
uniformity. In all cases the quotations in the following section are from Janis 
(1982, p. 174 and p. 175). 
The over-estimation symptoms of groupthink include the illusion of 
invulnerability and belief in the inherent morality of the group. Janis (1982) 
defined the illusion of invulnerability as being "shared by most or all of the 
members" and it "creates excessive optimism and encourages taking risks by 
group members". Here, the group considers itself too powerful to be 
threatened by outsiders or outside events and believes that any decision it 
makes will not adversely affect this power. The group is considered 
untouchable and immune to failure. The inherent morality of the group is an 
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"unquestioned belief' held by the group members, which acts by "inclining the 
members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decision". The 
group considers their goal to be worthy of any sacrifice, and ethical or moral 
issues will not stand in the way of the group decision. 
There are two symptoms of groupthink which involve the closed-
mindedness of group members. Collective rationalization "to discount 
warnings or other information that might lead the members to reconsider their 
assumptions before they re-commit themselves to their past policy decisions" 
involves a rejection of negative information. Any information which should 
lead the group to reconsider their decision is somehow justified by group 
members to make it seem invalid, wrong, or irrelevant. 
The second symptom of closed-mindedness is an extension of everyday 
stereotyping behaviour. Thus Janis' (1982) defined the stereotyping of 
outgroup leaders "as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as 
too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to defeat 
their purposes". The natural and often accurate human tendency to 
categorise people, and then place on them stereotyped attitudes based on 
this categorisation, is used by the decision maker to their own advantage. By 
taking this view, the opinions, attitudes and possible responses of both the 
outgroup and its leader can be ignored. This permits the ingroup to act as 
they wish without considering that their decision will be affected by the 
actions of others who may successfully prevent the enactment of their plans. 
The third type of groupthink symptom is the pressure for individual group 
members to conform to the group opinion, in an attempt to gain uniformity. 
There are four forms of pressure toward uniformity including the self 
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censorship of deviations, a shared illusion of unanimity, direct pressure, and 
mindguarding. 
Individuals display self censorship behaviour when they knowingly 
withhold information from the group due to of self-doubt. Janis (1982) states 
this is "reflecting each members inclination to minimise to himself the 
importance of his doubts and counter-arguments'. Often a group member will 
hold great misgivings about a group decision but, usually because the other 
group members seem to be in agreement, they do not raise these doubts. 
Consequently the individual reasons to themselves that as they are the only 
dissenter, then they must be wrong. 
A shared illusion of unanimity "concerning judgements conforming to the 
majority view (partly resulting from self censorship of deviations, augmented 
by the false assumption that silence means consent)" frequently follows on 
from the self censorship of deviations. These last two symptoms are very 
closely related, but either can occur without the other. The shared illusion of 
unanimity can occur even when more than one member disagrees with the 
apparent group unity, if those members do not verbalise these concerns. 
Direct pressure is applied to "any member who expresses strong 
arguments against any of the group's stereotypes, illusions, or commitments." 
Group pressure is used to maintain the collective interest. It is common for 
groups to pressurise members who criticize the groups assumptions or 
decisions. This can involve a personal attack on the deviant rather than a 
criticism of the opinion expressed, and usually originates from a powerful 
group member. 
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The final symptom of groupthink is the emergence of self-appointed 
mindguards who are "members who protect the group from adverse 
information that might shatter their shared complacency about the 
effectiveness and morality of their decisions". These mindguards may agree 
with the dominant position of the group, but be aware of information which 
could cast doubt on its suitability. They do not reveal this information to the 
group because they do not want to give any opening for dissent. The 
process differs from direct pressure and self censorship, in that mindguards 
do not suppress others' views, or their own beliefs, but instead suppress 
information of which they are aware, but with which they disagree. 
1.2.1.2.2 Symptoms Of Defective Decision Making 
As well as the eight symptoms of groupthink, Janis' (1982) model also 
includes seven symptoms of defective decision making. They occur as the 
outcome of the behaviours listed above. 
Firstly there may be an incomplete survey of alternatives, which means 
that only one or two courses of action are discussed and no real attempt is 
made to uncover any more. Secondly an incomplete survey of the groups' 
objectives may result in the group not achieving its intended goal. Third is a 
failure to examine the risks of the preferred choice, where the pitfalls of the 
most commonly preferred alternative may not be assessed to determine if it is 
the optimal course of action. Fourth is the failure to reappraise initially 
rejected alternatives, particularly in the light of the risks of the preferred 
option. Fifth, a poor information search is undertaken, resulting in a deficit of 
relevant information. Sixth a selective bias in processing information at hand 
can lead to insufficient consideration being given to any negative information 
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which is uncovered. Finally, there is a failure to work out any contingency 
plans, in case the preferred course of action fails. 
1.2.1.2.3 Low Probability Of Successful Outcome 
The low probability of a successful outcome is extremely probable in the 
presence of the above antecedents, and at least some of the above 
symptoms. Janis (1982) theorised that groupthink could be avoided if certain 
procedures were used, most of which involved preventing either the 
antecedents or the symptoms of groupthink developing within a decision 
making group. It is not the purpose of this paper to fully discuss the 
prevention of groupthink however, but to ascertain whether Janis' theory 
gains empirical support. 
1.2.2 Janis' Examples Of Groupthink 
In justifying the existence of his concept, Janis (1982; Janis & Mann, 
1977) pointed to famous examples where groups of intelligent people made 
poor decisions. In all cases, Janis used badly flawed political decisions, and 
in all cases he assumed that the resulting fiasco was caused by the decision 
making procedures used by the group. Likewise Janis' theory was also 
flawed. 
First, Janis (1982; Janis & Mann, 1977) used hindsight to support his 
theory. It could be said he used mindguarding himself. Secondly he did not 
perform any experimental study to test his theory. He cites several events that 
occurred naturally without any experimental controls. The examples he used 
may have been accidents of nature, as there are certainly other occasions 
where, although it would have been expected, groupthink did not occur. 
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Thirdly he had to rely on official documents, interviews and the like, which are 
biased accounts of events and may gloss unflattering over details. Further, by 
using naturally occurring events, Janis failed to have any experimental 
control. 
Janis (1982) mentions several examples of groupthink impaired political 
decisions, but there are four to which he most frequently returns. They are the 
fiascoes which occurred at the Bay of Pigs, in North Korea, Pearl Harbour and 
Vietnam. 
President Kennedy and his advisers, despite much evidence which 
should have prevented the action, attempted to invade Cuba in 1961, 
resulting in the death and capture of many of those who landed at the Bay of 
Pigs. President Truman and his advisers continued the war in North Korea, 
despite warnings about the outcome of such action from the Chinese. The 
attack on Pearl Harbour occurred with plenty of warning, but the decision 
makers who should have acted, failed to do so because they did not believe 
their equipment. President Johnson and his advisers increased the United 
States involvement in the Vietnam War despite evidence that this action was 
unlikely to be successful. 
In addition Janis (1982) also examined other examples of the groupthink 
theory. These included Watergate, President Ford's attack on Cambodia in 
1975, President Reagan's reduction in Social Security benefits in 1981, 
Neville Chamberlain's inner circle and their attempt to appease Hitler in 
1938 and 1939, President Carters' decision to rescue American hostages in 
Tehran in 1980, and the French disbelief of warnings of German invasion in 
1914. Of significance is Janis's perception that groupthink is not only a 
political issue, but may also occur in executive decision making in "a wide 
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variety of group decisions on vital issues" (Janis, 1982, p. 197). Janis 
stressed the need for laboratory studies based on his theory, but such work 
has not provided confirmation of the theory. The research will now be 
assessed in terms of its support of the groupthink theory. 
1.2.2.1 Studies Supporting Groupthink 
Research which has provided complete support for groupthink has been 
in the form of case studies similar to those used by Janis. Smith (1984) 
concluded that all eight symptoms of groupthink could be seen in the fiasco 
surrounding the United States attempt to rescue hostages from Tehran. He 
supported the existence of all eight groupthink symptoms. Moorhead, 
Ference and Neck (1991) similarly reviewed the space shuttle Challenger 
launch, and found that all of the antecedent conditions and all of the 
groupthink symptoms were present within the group which made the decision 
to launch the shuttle. 
While these two studies are the only ones to fully support all eight 
groupthink symptoms, other studies provide evidence of at least some. 
Hensley and Griffin (1986) found support for all groupthink symptoms except 
the illusion of unanimity in the Kent State University gymnasium controversy. 
Manz and Sims (1982) used three case studies to assess the value of 
groupthink, and claimed support for direct pressure, the illusion of unanimity, 
self-censorship, collective rationalization and shared stereotypes. Montanari 
and Moorhead (1989) found support for invulnerability, morality, self 
censorship, the lack of objectivity, and rationality as factors in groupthink. The 
illusion of invulnerability was supported by Terborg et al. (1976), as well as 
Thompson and Carsud (1976, in Callaway and Esser, 1984). 
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Janis (1986) found a strong relationship between the quality of decision 
making and the occurrence of groupthink symptoms in an analysis of crises 
since 1945. Esser and Lindoerfer (1989) found a similar result when the 
number of groupthink statements increased during the twenty four hours 
immediately preceding the space shuttle Challenger launch. McCauley's 
(1989) review of Janis's examples concluded that there was at least some 
support for the theory. Tatlock (1979) also used Janis's examples, and 
concluded that although groupthink groups were more positive about their 
'ingroup' and more simplistic about the issues, they were not more simplistic 
about 'outgroups' than were non groupthink groups. Courtright (1978) 
concluded that the theory Janis (1982) developed was both testable within a 
laboratory, and basically accurate. 
In a critique of Janis's theory Longley and Pruitt (1980) concluded that 
morality and stereotyping should be removed from the theory, but that the 
other six symptoms formed a usable theory had validity. Smith and White 
(1983) suggested that the theory had value, but could do with some 
remodelling. Both Longley and Pruitt (1980) and Moorhead and Montanari 
(1989) suggested that some of Janis's symptoms converged, and this may be 
a valid comment. The above critique proved to be the least detrimental of the 
research against groupthink. 
1.2.2.2 Studies That Did Not Support Groupthink 
Aldag and Riggs-Fuller (1993) found a lack of support for the groupthink 
concept. As such, they expanded on the groupthink theory to develop the 
General Group Problem-Solving model (GGPS). This model is conceptually 
similar to groupthink, but its characteristics are positive in orientation. Neck 
and Moorhead (1992) found that despite the presence of all the groupthink 
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antecedents, groupthink did not occur during their analysis of the jury 
deliberations for the trial of John De Lorean. They argued that a selective bias 
has been used to promote particular historical events as examples of 
groupthink. This type of bias clearly limits the validity of the theory. 
1.2.2.3 Support For Cohesion Within Groupthink 
As with support for groupthink itself, the element of cohesion within the 
model has received little support. Those studies which have confirmed 
Janis's conclusions have had similar methodology to Janis (Huseman & 
Driver, 1979). 
1.2.2.4 Studies That Did Not Support Cohesion In 
Groupthink 
Numerous researchers have found that the effect of cohesion on group 
decision making has been the opposite to Janis' (1982) proposition. 
Callaway and Esser (1984) concluded that high cohesion levels and poor 
quality decision procedures preceded the worst quality decisions, while the 
best quality decisions were made by groups with moderate levels of 
cohesion. 
Leana (1985) focused on group cohesiveness in her study of college 
students who had either been in small class groups together for one semester 
or those who were not from the same class. This study found that the non 
cohesive groups displayed more self censorship behaviour than did the 
cohesive groups. This finding also opposes Janis's theory. Furthermore, 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986) found that in a study of groups with a three 
month history, highly cohesive groups displayed less self censorship than low 
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cohesion groups. Flowers (1977) performed one of the classic studies of 
groupthink, and found that while leadership style had a significant effect on 
the number of solutions put forward, cohesion did not. 
Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang and Field (1992) found group 
cohesiveness to have no value as a predictor of groupthink. Further, Longley 
and Pruitt (1980) concluded that groupthink was more likely in groups lacking 
high cohesion. They also claimed cohesion was more likely to occur in the 
first stage of group development rather than later, due to a false cohesion, 
which occurs early in the life of a group. 
In summary the support for groupthink has been varied. The evidence 
from case study reviews has proved more positive than that from laboratory 
studies, which frequently contain methodological errors. Although groupthink 
symptoms found support, Janis's emphasis on the importance of cohesion 
has generally been unsupported. 
1.3 COHESION 
Cohesion is one of the two most studied aspects of groupthink (Drescher 
et al., 1985; Podsakoff & Todor, 1985), second only to leadership. Prior to 
Janis (1982) cohesion was studied as an independent topic (Cartwright, 
1968; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Gross & Martin, 1952; Hagstrom & 
Selvin, 1965; Libo, 1953; Lott & Lott , 1961; 1965; Mikalachki, 1969; Pepitone 
& Kleiner, 1957; Seashore, 1952; Van Bergen & Koekebakker, 1959). 
Cohesion is possibly the most obvious factor to influence the occurrence of 
groupthink, and almost without exception it is assumed to have a negative 
influence on group decision quality. Cohesion does yield some positive 
effects such as increased group stability, increased member satisfaction, and 
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increased group influence, which Forsyth (1990) claimed are usually 
overlooked in studies of groupthink. Arguably this occurs because all the 
positive factors of cohesion, such as increased group stability and satisfaction 
(Forsyth, 1990) are detrimental when they occur to excess. 
Although cohesion or the effects of cohesion has been studied, it is still a 
poorly defined concept (Drescher et al., 1985). In fact, there has yet to be a 
definition which satisfies the general research population. Many authors 
have pointed out the difficulties in defining the concept (Bernthal & Insko, 
1993; Evans & Jarvis, 1989; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Mikalachki, 1969; 
Mudrack, 1989; Nixon, 1976; Stokes, 1983). The definitions of cohesion have 
been so varied that it has been suggested that the vast array of studies have 
not all assessed the same concept (Drescher et al., 1985). The most common 
forms of definition are those which define the concept of cohesion as either 
"attraction to group" or "a field of forces". 
1.3.1 The Problem Of Defining Cohesion 
The attraction to group approach reached a pinnacle with the study by 
Lott and Lott (1965, p. 259), who describe the main component of cohesion 
as "interpersonal attraction" within the group as a whole. While this was not 
the first citation of attraction to group as a definition of cohesion (Festinger, 
1950; Pepitone & Kleiner, 1957; Seashore, 1952) it is frequently cited by 
other researchers as one of the best (Mudrack, 1989; Summers et al., 1988; 
Turner et al., 1985). The idea of attraction to the group as a definition of 
cohesion has been widely accepted and is used by many writers (Barnard et 
al., 1991; Bednar et al., 1974, in Evans & Jarvis, 1989; Cartwright, 1968; 
Drescher, Burlingham & Fuhriman, 1985; Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1987; Hogg 
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& Turner, 1985; Johnson, 1981; Lott, 1961; Mikalachki, 1969; Peteroy, 1980; 
Stokes et al., 1983; Wheeless et al., 1982). 
The other common approach to the definition of cohesion has been the 
"field of forces" approach (Cartwright 1968, in Cartwright & Zander, 1969; 
Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Gross & Martin, 1952; Gruber, 1981; Libo, 
1953; Piper et al., 1983; Piper et al., 1984; Schachter et al., 1968). This type 
of definition is an extension of the attraction to group approaches, and some 
authors have made the move from one form of definition to the other 
(Festinger, 1950; Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950). The difference 
between these two definitions is that one focuses solely on what attracts the 
members to the group, whereas the other focuses on the reasons for that 
attraction to the group. 
The most frequently quoted definition of cohesion is that of Festinger, 
Schachter and Back (1950, p. 164), who defined cohesion as "the total field of 
forces that act on members to remain in the group". In an independent study 
later that year, Festinger (1950, p.274) altered his definition of cohesion to 
"the resultant of all the forces acting on members to remain in the group". 
Even when not used outright, these definitions are mentioned as milestones 
by most writers in this field (Bakeman & Helmreich, 1975; Cartwright, 1968; 
Dion et al., 1971; Drescher, Burlingham & Fuhriman, 1985; Evans & Jarvis, 
1989; Gruber, 1981; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Lott, 1961; Mudrack, 1989; 
Sakurai, 1975; Van Bergen & Koekebakker, 1959; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1987). 
One definition of cohesion which cannot be overlooked in a study of 
groupthink, is that by Janis (1982). His definition of cohesion in relation to 
the groups he studied was "The high degree to which the members value 
their membership in the group and want to continue to be affiliated" (Janis 
1982, p. 245). It is important to remember that this was a definition created 
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with the benefit of hindsight, but at the same time it is the one developed 
specifically with reference to groupthink. 
1.3.1.1 What Constitutes A Cohesive Group? 
Cohesion has been related to many factors. It has been shown to be 
positively related to group morale (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990), similarity among 
group members (Good & Nelson, 1971; Lott & Lott, 1965; Szilagyi & Wallace, 
1983, in Summers et al., 1988; Zander, 1979), public declarations of 
commitment to a course of action (Zander, 1979), the amount of time group 
members spend together (Drescher et al., 1985; Pelz & Andrews, 1966, in 
Dailey, 1977; Seashore, 1952; Szilagyi & Wallace, 1983, in Summers et al., 
1988; Zander, 1979), stability of group membership (Forsyth, 1990; Shaw, 
1976), the group and individual goal match (Shaw, 1976; Szilagyi & Wallace, 
1983 in Summers et al., 1988; Wheeless et al., 1982), the presence of an 
external threat (Shaw, 1976; Szilagyi & Wallace, 1983 in Summers et al., 
1988), the exclusivity of membership (Shaw, 1976; Szilagyi & Wallace, 1983 
in Summers et al., 1988), the satisfaction that the group provides for its 
members (Forsyth, 1990; Pelz & Andrews, 1966 in Dailey, 1977; Wheeless et 
al., 1982), and role interdependence (Mikalachki, 1969). 
Other concepts have also been used to define cohesion. Examples are 
"stick-togetherness" (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990; Carron, 1982; Gross & Martin, 
1952; Libo, 1953; Mikalachki, 1969; Mudrack, 1989, in Nixon 1976), 
"bonded" "(Mudrack, 1989; Piper et al., 1984; Piper et al., 1983, in Mudrack, 
1989), "solidarity" (Durkheim, 1897 in Forsyth, 1990; Mudrack, 1989; 
Wheeless et al., 1982), "commitment" (Fisher, 1974; Mudrack, 1989), ''group 
spirit or identity" (Fisher, 1974; Owen, 1985; Staw, 1975; Stogdill, 1972), 
"belonging" (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990; Bugen, 1977; Good & Nelson, 1971; 
Mudrack, 1989), "desire to remain in the group" (Cartwright, 1968, in 
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Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Dailey, 1977; Gross & Martin, 1952; Mudrack, 
1989; Seashore, 1952; Summers et al., 1988; Zander, 1979), "we-ness" 
(Forsyth, 1990; Libo, 1953; Mudrack, 1989; Owen, 1985), and "loyalty" 
(Burton, 1990; Fisher, 1974). 
The necessity for the existence of an objective or goal for the group 
(Carron, 1982; Goodman et al., 1987), and mutuality (Barnard et al., 1991; 
Gruber, 1981; Lott, 1961; Lott & Lott, 1965; Mikalachki, 1969; Stogdill, 1972; 
Summers et al., 1988; Turner, 1987) in their definitions of cohesion have 
been further inclusions in the work of authors. Some researchers have 
defined different types of cohesion, such as social cohesion and task 
cohesion (Drescher, Burlingham & Fuhriman, 1985; Piper et al., 1984; 
Schachter et al., 1968; Stokes, 1983). Cohesion has also been seen as a 
factor which should be measured on a continuum, rather than as an all-or-
nothing phenomenon (Carron, 1982; Fisher, 1974). 
1.3.1.2 How Has The Problem Of Definition Been Solved? 
Researchers have avoided the problem of defining cohesion by quoting 
the definitions of others (Dailey, 1977; Downing, 1958; Eisman, 1959; George 
& Bettenhausen, 1990; Libo, 1953; Nixon, 1976; Terborg et al., 1976; 
Wheeless et al., 1982). However, because many definitions appear 
incomplete this approach is not adequate. Few researchers develop their 
own definitions, and frequently the issue is brushed aside while researchers 
ignore the need to have a definition (Mudrack, 1989). 
A major issue of concern in the cohesion literature, is that the term 
cohesion has often been used, and even measured as a variable, without it 
being defined. This has been done in two ways. Firstly many authors have 
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described rather than defined the concept (Bakeman & Helmreich, 1975; 
Good & Nelson, 1971; Mudrack, 1989; Sakurai, 1975; Terborg et al., 1976; 
Wolf, 1985). These authors have all given broad and vague descriptions of 
what cohesion is, but do not settle on a firm working definition, not even that 
provided by another researcher. 
Secondly, there has been the assumption that the reader is already 
familiar with the definition of the term, and therefore no attempt has been 
made to further define cohesion (Baird, 1982; Berkowitz, 1954; Cohen et al, 
1960; Dion et al., 1971; Evans & Dion, 1991; Greene, 1989; Peteroy, 1983; 
Rabbie et al., 1974; Shaw & Shaw, 1962; Staw, 1975; Stewart, 1988; Taylor 
& Tyler, 1986; Tziner & Vardi, 1982; Van Bergen & Koekebakker, 1959; 
Weinberg et al., 1981 ). Several of these studies actually use cohesion as an 
experimental variable, without first defining what it is that you are looking for 
(Peteroy, 1983; Rabbie et al., 1974; Sakurai, 1975; Shaw & Shaw, 1962; 
Staw, 1975; Stewart, 1988; Weinberg et al., 1981 ). Furthermore, studies 
critiquing other research (Mudrack, 1989; Stodgill, 1972) have shown each 
study to have a different measurement instrument for cohesion, and resulting 
in the utilisation of a multitude of measures. 
Taking the definitional problem into account, no attempt is made in the 
present study to create a new definition of cohesion or adopt one belonging 
to another researcher. Rather than be forced to choose one type of definition 
over another, this research uses elements of the most commonly accepted 
definitions and combines them 
In summary, the above overview contains a variety of definitions, and it is 
not intended to add to them further by developing yet another. 
Simultaneously, there is no one definition that can be considered satisfactory 
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either. As such no working definition will be used in this study. A reason for 
this, is that the detailed literature review provides a descriptive account of the 
concept. 
1.3.2 Cohesion In Research 
Having covered the vast array of definitions of group cohesion in the 
literature, it is necessary to ascertain what is presently known about the 
subject. Cohesion has been studied in relation to several concepts such as 
productivity (Berkowitz, 1954; Greene, 1989; Mudrack, 1989; Podsakoff & 
Todor, 1985; Schachter et al., 1951; Schachter et al., 1968; Stogdill, 1972), 
performance (Bakeman & Helmreich, 1975; Evans & Dion, 1991; Staw, 1975; 
Terborg et al., 1976; Tziner & Vardi, 1982; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1987), group 
composition (Forsyth, 1990; Barnard et al., 1991; Marshall & Heslin, 1975; 
Bugen, 1977; Peteroy, 1980; Worchel et al., 1991), sporting success (Carron, 
1982; Gruber, 1981; Nixon, 1976), classroom learning (Shaw & Shaw, 1962), 
conformity and dissent (Forsyth, 1990; Sakurai, 1975; Worchel et al., 1991 ), 
and the work group (Dailey, 1977; George & Bettenhausen, 1990; Libo, 1953; 
Mikalachki, 1969; O'Reilly & Roberts, 1977; Seashore, 1952; Summers et al., 
i 988). Several of these studies are reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
1.3.3 Cohesion And Work 
The major application for the concept of cohesion within industrial 
psychology, is the effect it may have on the work group. Several different 
approaches have been used when studying cohesion within this setting, 
including the measurement of performance, productivity and outcome, as 
affected by group cohesion. The studies discussed below are a sample of the 
main research done in this field. Cohesion appears to have a positive effect 
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within the work place, as can be seen when its relationship to production and 
performance are discussed. 
1.3.3.1 Cohesion And Productivity 
Cohesion has been linked to the levels of production or performance of 
groups. The common theme in this type of research seems to be that 
cohesion will have an effect on the output of a group, but whether that will be 
a positive or negative effect is still undecided. In fact the results of these 
studies have been conflicting (Lott & Lott, 1965) and inconclusive (Greene, 
1989; Stodgill, 1972). The main swing seems to be toward a positive effect 
(Evans & Dion, 1991; Greene, 1989; Seashore, 1952; Wheeless et al., 1982). 
The majority of studies have found a positive relationship between 
cohesion and productivity (Dailey, 1977; Evans & Dion, 1991; George & 
Bettenhausen, 1990; Greene, 1989; Mikalachki, 1969; Seashore, 1952; 
Summers et al., 1988). These researchers have found cohesion to have a 
positive effect on productivity, and productivity related work habits such as 
decreased absenteeism (Mikalachki, 1969), increased turnover (George & 
Bettenhausen, 1990), reduced anxiety, and increased uniformity of 
production (Seashore, 1952). Cohen et al. (1960) also found that trained 
cohesive groups were able to produce significantly more ideas than any other 
group. 
Several studies have contradicted this research. Stodgill (1972) 
reviewed previous studies and found that cohesion adversely affected 
productivity, which he claimed was due to the conflict the two created for the 
groups' time. Research by Schachter et al. (1968) produced similar results. 
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There has been a lack of consensus amongst researchers on the 
relationship between cohesion and productivity. However some research 
has united these contradictions. (Fisher, 1974; Forsyth, 1990). For example, 
Fisher (1974) developed a curvilinear model which explained how both 
findings have found support. Within this model cohesion and productivity 
increased in unison to an optimal point. At this point the increase stabilised 
and remained constant. Any further increase in one factor resulted in a 
decline in the other. 
Another indicator of a High Cohesion Group, is the verbal expression of 
intimate information was perceived as an indicator of a high cohesion group 
(Stokes et al., 1983). However, this held only if the information was not 
disclosed too early in the life of the group. Early disclosures appeared to 
make the group members uncomfortable (Stokes et al., 1983). Peteroy 
(1980) suggested that members of cohesive groups might feel more 
comfortable than members of non cohesive groups about giving fellow 
participants feedback and partaking in self disclosure. 
1.3.3.2 Cohesion And Performance 
Unlike productivity, there has been plenty of support for a positive 
relationship between cohesion and performance. Staw (1975), Bakeman 
and Helmreich (1975), Wheeless et al. (1982), and Miesing and Prebble 
(1985) all gained results which indicated a positive relationship between the 
two variables. 
Staw (1975) found that subjects who were told that their group had 
performed well, developed higher levels of cohesion than did subjects who 
were told their group had performed poorly. Equally, Hoogstraten and Vorst 
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(1978) found that the performance of a group task increased cohesion, but 
the performance of an individual task did not. Bakeman and Helmreich 
(1975) obtained a similar result in a field study where a groups' cohesion in 
their leisure time was highly correlated with their work group performance. A 
positive correlation between satisfaction, cohesion, performance and 
interaction was also found by Wheeless et al. (1982). Miesing and Prebble 
(1985) found cohesion to be significant in explaining high performance in 
laboratory simulations, where highly cohesive groups with high performance 
norms performed at the highest level. 
Alternatively Tziner and Vardi (1982) found the performance of self 
selected Israeli tank crews was not significantly affected by cohesion. When 
combined with command style, cohesion did however reach a level of 
significance. 
1.3.4 Types Of Cohesion 
Cohesion has frequently come under fire as an undefined concept, and 
therefore unmeasurable. One response to this criticism has been to use a 
multidimensional approach to the definition of cohesion. This has been fairly 
popular, and taken many forms. 
Several authors (Bernthal & Insko, 1993; Grubb, 1987; Hagstrom & Selvin, 
1965; Mikalachki, 1969; Wheeless et al., 1982; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1987) have 
measured cohesion in a multidimensional manner. These researchers have 
acknowledged the need to re-define cohesion, in accordance with the variety 
of concepts it includes. Bernthal and Insko (1993) concluded that one reason 
cohesion does not always lead to groupthink is because there is more than 
one type of cohesion. Most approaches differentiate between socially 
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orientated cohesion and task orientated cohesion. Socially orientated 
cohesion focuses on the role of the group as a provider of social satisfaction, 
while task orientated cohesion focuses on the task the group is aiming to 
achieve. Task orientated cohesion was shown to prevent groupthink 
(Bernthal & Insko, 1993), and therefore should be promoted within decision 
making groups, although social emotional cohesion does not necessarily 
have to be completely rejected. In highly task orientated groups, group 
effectiveness may determine attraction, and that effectiveness will be 
hindered by high levels of friendship (Hagstrom & Selvin, 1965). 
Zaccaro and Lowe (1987) divided cohesion into task-based (personal 
attainment of goals) and interpersonal (interpersonal relationships within a 
group) types. The results of their study showed that high task-based 
cohesion improved group performance, but interpersonal cohesion did not. 
Mikalachki (1969) developed the concept of social control as an element of 
cohesion. This included group members either internalising the rights of the 
group, or the use of threats and punishment to maintain the group norm. 
Drescher et al. (1985), also advocated (a ~oult~mensional approach to 
cohesion assessment, and identified a person dimension and a time 
dimension within the concept. 
1.4 ISSUE IMPORTANCE AND THE CONTROVERSIALITY 
OF THE TOPIC 
This is an area of research which has largely been untouched. Very few 
studies have addressed the topic of group discussion within the groupthink 
framework. The following is an overview of those studies which have 
assessed the impact of topic. 
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1.4.1 Issue Importance 
Logically one would assume that the significance of the issue under 
discussion would influence the likelihood of groupthink. Surprisingly, there 
has been a paucity of research in this area. For example McGraw, Lodge and 
Stroh (1990) found that potential voters gave more consideration to issues of 
personal importance than to issues which were not of personal importance in 
their voting behaviour. Kerr (1991) claimed that individuals showed no 
significant concern or interest in personally unimportant issues, which lead to 
a lack of commitment to a course of action. In addition, Kerr (1992) found that 
groups came to an unanimous agreement more easily for unimportant issues 
than for important issues. 
Studies by Kerr (1991; 1992) have shown that as the importance of the 
issue to the group members decreased, so did the power of the majority to 
influence the individual. Kerr (1991) suggested that groups became more 
group orientated rather than task orientated as the issue importance declined. 
This would explain the conclusion common to the above studies, that as the 
group members' personal interest in an issue decreased, the same group 
members came to an agreement more easily and were less interested in 
following the outcome. 
Issue importance has also been related to the personal interactions that 
occur within the group. Shure et al. (1962) concluded that when planning 
and task activity were required to take place simultaneously, planning gave 
way to task activities. An example of this effect would be when a group of 
strangers were required to immediately solve a problem, before becoming 
acquainted with each other. Shure et al. (1962) assumed that attention 
could only be given to one activity at a time, and the most pressing activity 
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won out. Further, when the group members believed that a task was 
important, they showed more systematic processing than when they 
considered their task to be of low importance (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 
1991 ). 
1.4.2 Cohesion And Issue Importance 
Studies that address both cohesion and issue importance are fewer than 
those which address issue alone. Barnard et al. (1991) assessed the effects 
of cohesion versus conflict in groups where members were either unanimous 
in their decisions about four controversial topics, or where the groups 
contained one deviate. The aim was to achieve an unanimous agreement. 
The results indicated that the opinion change of a deviate was higher when 
the group was cohesive than when it was not cohesive. 
Research has found that there is a tendency for groups to favour the 
proposal which is most in support of their self interest. In Hagen and Burch 
(1985) the group members chose their own subject for discussion, and the 
experimenters, then measured the amount of off topic discussion amongst the 
group. They found a positive relationship between task accomplishment and 
group satisfaction. Young et al. (1991) assessed self interest and level of 
experience of two topics. 
There has been a lack of research that examines issue importance and 
discussion topic in the context of groupthink. When this deficit is looked at 
alongside the multitude of problems within the research on cohesion, it 
becomes obvious that there is a real need for more research in this field. 
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1 .5 PROBLEMS FOUND IN THE REVIEW OF PAST 
RESEARCH 
The ambiguity of previous research has led to uncertainty regarding its 
validity. This is evident when one examines how research has focused on 
only a few aspects of a very complex concept by seldom moving past studies 
of cohesion and leadership. Within the cohesion research, the methodology 
has often been criticised. Researchers have attempted to "create" cohesive 
groups in several unsatisfactory ways, and then tried to generalise from the 
results obtained in such studies. 
1.5.1 The Limitations Of Previous Groupthink Research 
Previous research, while extensively addressing some aspects of Janis' 
(1982) groupthink model, has left antecedents other than cohesion and 
leadership largely untouched. The theory has rarely been studied in its 
entirety, with researchers frequently addressing only one or two antecedents 
or symptoms at a time (Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Park, 1990). Many associated 
variables, such as the importance of the topic under discussion have been 
almost completely unstudied. Complete acceptance of the groupthink model 
is not possible without further studies of the entire theory (Posner-Weber, 
1987; Park, 1990; Aldag & Riggs-Fuller, (1993). 
Many of the errors in groupthink research are also true of the research 
done on cohesion. These tend to revolve around the two issues of definition 
and experimental methodology. The definitional problem has already been 
discussed at length, and the methodology problems now need to be 
addressed. 
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1.5.2 The Limitations Of Previous Research On Cohesion 
The main type of methodological error made in previous groupthink 
research is in the manipulation of the cohesion measure. Researchers have 
frequently attempted to create cohesion where none exists. Whereas Janis 
(1982) considered cohesion to be something that develops over time rather 
than something able to be created at will, many researchers are guilty of 
attempting to enforce it on their subjects. Numerous studies have attempted 
to manipulate the cohesion of two groups, usually by telling the members of 
one they will like each other, and telling the members of the other that they 
could not be placed in a group that they would like (Baird, 1982; Berkowitz, 
1954; Cohen et al, 1960; Dion, 1971; Downing, 1958; Evans & Dion, 1991; 
Good & Nelson, 1971; Schachter et al., 1951) and so had to be placed in this 
group. 
This kind of methodology relies very heavily on a series of assumptions 
which may or may not be true, and are certainly simplifications of a complex 
social situation. It is assumed that by informing a group member that the 
other members of their group are similar to themselves, that person will feel 
positively toward those other group members (Gross & Martin, 1952). This 
assumes that a positive relationship within the group can be created at will to 
resemble the cohesion of Janis' (1982) groups, and that this effect will last 
even if when the group comes together, they obviously will not get on well. 
This type of procedure assumes that the experimental instructions will 
automatically be accepted at face value, and will not be affected by 
experience (Gross & Martin, 1952). 
The other type of manipulation that has been used, has been the altering 
of individuals' or groups' feedback in an attempt to make a group appear 
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either "cohesive" or "non cohesive" (Baird, 1982; Berkowitz, 1954; Carron, 
1982; Dion et al., 1971; Downing, 1958; Schachter et al., 1951; Zaccaro & 
Lowe, 1987). These methods have often been used in tests of Janis (1982) 
theory. This has created a glaring and unacceptable fault in the research to 
date and it is unacceptable that this research should be given any credence 
at all. An example is Flowers (1977) who tried to create cohesive groups by 
forming groups where each member of the group knew the group leader, but 
where there was not necessarily a group history as such. 
Most studies of cohesion have produced "cohesive" and "non cohesive" 
groups, which do not match Janis' (1982;) definition of cohesion (Janis & 
Mann, 1977). He considered that a cohesive group was characterised by 
having a past, a present and a future. Janis (1982) believed that cohesive 
groups were not experimentally created, but carefully formed and frequently 
self-selected groups of people with a common cause. The group members 
had frequently known each other for years, and existed within the same social 
circle. They worked and socialised together as much through choice as 
through necessity. In addition, the group members and often their families 
actually liked each other. These people formed homogeneous groups, which 
Janis (1982) considered cohesive. 
Other limitations in previous studies of cohesion include the way cohesion 
has been measured. Piper, Marrache, Lacriox, Richardson, and Jones 
(1983) considered that some researchers had measured the antecedents of 
cohesion rather than the concept itself. While the relationship between 
cohesion and productivity has frequently been studied over the years few, if 
any, studies use the same measures as each other (Mud rack, 1989). Each 
different measure cannot necessarily be compared to any other and the result 
has been few research advances in the field. Mudrack (1989) considers 
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these approaches to the measurement of cohesion to be so different from 
each other, as to make it questionable whether they even measure the same 
concept. 
Further, on the associated point of the output by cohesive and non-
cohesive groups, many researchers still assume that by combining the results 
of individual group members they have obtained a measure of group output 
(Fisher, 1974). This is not an acceptable assumption, because it does not 
account for the processes that occur inside the group which act to increase or 
decrease this rate of production. 
1.6 RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
Resent research has shown little support for Janis' theory in its entirety. 
This is not surprising as the theory has a large number of components. It has 
however left a number of questions unanswered. 
The present study derives from inconsistencies regarding the effect of 
cohesion in groupthink. As already mentioned, most of the research 
undertaken on groupthink has addressed the concepts of leadership and 
cohesion. Whether this is because they are easier to study, or whether they 
are considered more influential in the development of groupthink is uncertain. 
The leadership issue has been given more attention than has cohesion, and 
certain leadership styles have been found to be important in groupthink 
research. The overwhelming finding has pointed to the benefit of an open 
and casual leadership. 
Why have researchers not used existing groups to establish solid 
findings? The answer would appear to lie in the difficulty in obtaining these 
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groups for research. Existing groups, which are willing to co-operate in 
research of this type are not easy to find. Even then, to study them while they 
work on real problems can be even harder. The biggest error in the current 
research is a lack of work on the kind of group Janis considered to be 
cohesive. 
1.7 THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study sought to correct some of the errors in past research. 
The primary goal in undertaking the present research was to use a group with 
a past, present and future. That is, a group which spent a significant amount 
of time together in the work place or classroom as well as socially, and who 
fitted the description of a cohesive group as defined by Janis (1982). 
Finding such a group was no easy task, and a group of Christchurch 
College of Education students were paid for their involvement. These 
subjects fitted the requirements of the study and were willing to participate. 
Further subjects were obtained for comparative purposes. 
It was deemed very important to use discussion topics which were 
relevant to the subjects, and so they selected them themselves. This process 
involved creating a group list of potential discussion topics which they were 
told had to be both . controversial and relevant to their group. The 
experimenter then used these to select the final topics. Although this method 
did not create topics of the same nature as those cited in Janis (1982), it was 
decided that this method would uncover issues that were relevant to the 
group under study. This naturally led to topics which were not business 
orientated, and which required a recommendation rather than a firm policy or 
plan of action. 
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This drawback was weighed against the importance of using a real world 
issue, with which the subjects could identify and of which they had prior 
knowledge and experience. It was decided that realism was the most 
important factor in the study. The use of irrelevant problem-solving games, 
which are probably meaningless to the participant, could not be fully justified 
in the present study, as the emphasis was on real groups and real issues. 
Having established a deficit in the area of groupthink research, this 
deficiency was translated into two hypotheses in need of testing. 
1.8 HYPOTHESES 
The Hypotheses to be tested were: 
Hypothesis One : That the level of group cohesion will have a significant 
effect on the occurrence of groupthink symptoms. 
Hypothesis Two : That the topic under discussion will have a significant 




Fifteen subjects participated in the present study. These subjects were 
divided into three groups, each of five people. One group was an existing 
group of five members which comprised both males and females. These 
subjects were Christchurch College of Education students, while the other two 
groups were made up of volunteer subjects from the Christchurch College of 
Education and University of Canterbury. The only control undertaken in the 
selection procedures for these two groups was to ensure that the groups 
contained both male and female members. 
The existing group and one of the other two groups completed five 
discussion sessions. The first session was used to determine the topics of 
discussion for the latter sessions. The remaining four sessions each 
addressed a different topic which the group had previously chosen. The 
topics for discussion were placed in an order relating to how potentially 
controversial they would be for the group members, with the final session 
addressing an extremely divisive topic. The third group had only one group 
discussion, during which they addressed the same highly controversial issue 
that the other two groups discussed in their fifth and final session. 
2.1 SUBJECTS 
The subjects for this study were recruited through advertisements placed 
in "De Press", the student publication at the Christchurch College of 
Education, and through advertising at the Student Job Search at the 
University of Canterbury. From this advertising, five third year Christchurch 
College of Education students came forward as a group. This was labelled 
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the High Cohesion Group (refer 2.1.1) and contained three male and two 
female members. 
In order to create two more groups of equal size to the first, it was 
necessary to obtain another ten subjects. These subjects were obtained in the 
same manner as the first group. They comprised of both Christchurch 
College of Education, and University of Canterbury students. None of these 
volunteers had ever met each other before. The distribution between these 
groups was on a random basis. One group of two male and three female 
subjects, was labelled the Low Cohesion Group and had five experimental 
sessions. The other group contained three male and two female subjects. 
This group was labelled the Non Cohesion Group and met for only one 
experimental session. 
All three groups used in the study contained both males and females. 
The age range was from 18 to 45, although most subjects were between 22 
and 25. The subjects used were all paid volunteers, employed to participate 
in this study. They were informed that they were participating in a study on 
group decision making. Because subjects would be required to participate in 
up to five group discussions, each of approximately half an hour, subjects 
were not paid until the completion of the debriefing, twenty-four hours after the 
last session. 
2.1.1 High Cohesion Group (Group One) 
This group met the criteria of a cohesive group, as assessed by their 
answers to the Group Questionnaire discussed in section 2.2.1. This group 
satisfied Janis's (1982) theoretical requirement that cohesiveness was 
dependant on members having a past history, a present and future of 
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interactions. At the commencement of the first session, subjects in this group 
averaged 6.4 on a seven point Likert scale to the statement "I have known the 
other members of this group previous to this meeting". The range of the scale 
was; one was "no", two was "seen before", four was "slightly", and seven was 
labelled "very well". In comparison, responses from members of the other 
groups when asked this same question, showed an average score of 1.0 for 
the Low Cohesion Group, and 1.4 for the Non Cohesion Group. 
The High Cohesion Group consisted of five Christchurch College of 
Education students. It consisted of three males and two females, who were all 
in their early twenties. They were all European, unmarried and one had a 
child. They were all in their third year of study as Secondary School trainees, 
and therefore they attended many classes together. These subjects had 
known each other as a group for at least eight months. However, the group 
members were not constantly together either in class or socially. They all took 
different subjects within their course at the Christchurch College of Education, 
but these classes usually included other members of the group. 
The subjects were individually asked how much time they spent with the 
other members of the group, and they reported that they spent a minimum of 
ten hours a week in class or study time together. Mostly this was time they 
spent with one or two members of the group, rather than with the group as a 
whole. Some of them spent up to sixteen hours a week in class or study time 
with another group member. In addition, subjects reported that they tended to 
choose each other as work mates whenever they were requested to form 
small study, work or role playing groups in class. 
The average time each group members reported spending socially with 
other group members was 14.4 hours per week. Some members of the group 
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reported spending up to twenty hours per week with other group members, 
while others spent only between one and five hours per week socially with 
other group members. Furthermore, three members of this group also 
reported that they considered two other group members to be close friends. 
Only one group m~mber reported no close friends within the group. In 
('), 7:0• I r• . - (\. ''{ 
contrast, of the two groups studied, there were no reports of group members 
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considering each other as close friends, and no reports of spending time 
together either socially or in class. 
2.1.2 Low Cohesion Group (Group Two) 
The five participants in the Low Cohesion Group had never met before. 
Four were Christchurch College of Education students and the fifth was a 
University of Canterbury student. Of these subjects, three were Primary 
School trainees, each at a different stage of their course. One subject was a 
Secondary School trainee in his final year and the other subject was a first 
year university student.. There were three females and two males and they 
were all in their late teens or early twenties. They were all European, 
unmarried and childless. 
None of these subjects had ever met before the first experimental 
session. They had no past, present, or future interaction, with the exception of 
the experimental sessions. They were therefore, a group with no cohesion at 
the beginning of the first session. By the final session however, this group 
may have developed some level of cohesion, and this could have affected the 
outcome of that session. It was at this point that due to the experimental 
procedures to be used, it was considered that it would be beneficial to add a 
third group to the study. 
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2.1.3 Non Cohesion Group (Group Three) 
Like the Low Cohesion Group, the final group consisted of five people 
who had never met before. Only one subject was a Christchurch College of 
Education student and the remaining four were University of Canterbury 
students. Three of the subjects were males and two female. They ranged in 
age from their late teens through early twenties, with two subjects in this 
group being over 35 years. Four of the subjects were European, with one 
subject being Maori. Three were unmarried, with the other two either married 
or living with a partner. One subject had children. 
Although Group Three was similar to Group Two in members' initial 
cohesiveness, this group differed in that they met only once during the course 
of the study. Because they were not to be studied after their single 
experimental session, they were labelled the Non Cohesion Group. 
2.2 MATERIALS 
2.2.1 Group Questionnaire 
The Group Questionnaire (Appendix 1) was designed with the intention 
of testing the cohesion of the group, both at the beginning of the study, and to 
see if there was any change in levels of cohesion over the course of the study. 
The questionnaire contained items about each member's attraction to the 
group, confidence about the group, liking of the group, perception of group 
success, group spirit, individual contribution to the group, and desire to 
continue with the group. It comprised a list of fourteen statements each scored 
on a seven point Likert scale, and a further three questions which involved 
short answer responses. These short answer questions were used to obtain 
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information on the exact length of time the group had existed, and the amount 
of time the members of group one spent together. 
Given the problems of finding a clear and generally accepted definition 
of cohesion, the questionnaire was designed using questions based on 
several different definitions of cohesion. Questions one to four were taken 
directly from Leana (1985), whose work focused on the relationship of 
attraction to group as group cohesion. The design of questions nine to 
twelve, fourteen and fifteen, used Mudrack's (1989) analyses of cohesiveness 
definitions. The remaining questions five to eight, thirteen, and seventeen 
were designed to obtain further biographical information on the history of the 
groups, and to discover the level of friendship or closeness among group 
members. 
This questionnaire was administered three times to the High Cohesion 
Group and three times to the Low Cohesion Group. Both of these groups 
received the questionnaire at the beginning of the first, third and fifth sessions. 
This was done to test for changes in group cohesion over the course of the 
study. The Non Cohesion Group completed the questionnaire only once, as 
the group was not to meet again, and a test of change in cohesion was not 
required for this group. 
2.2.2 Issue Questionnaire 
The Issue Questionnaire (Appendix 2) was designed for the present 
study to determine whether the topics of the study were important to the 
subjects and to assess their level of experience with these topics. It was also 
designed to discover if the subjects had withheld any information from the 
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group sessions. It was administered upon the completion of the debriefing 
session. 
This questionnaire comprised two yes/no questions, and eleven short 
answer questions. This was a test of the subjects' openness in the group 
discussion sessions. It was administered once to each of the three groups at 
the completion of the post-study debriefing, which was held twenty four hours 
after the last session of each group. The questions asked whether the 
subjects had discussed the topics before and/or after the sessions, with whom 
they had discussed the topics, if their opinions had changed at any time, if 
they had not mentioned something that they knew was relevant, and if they 
had thought after the session that the group decision was wrong. Because of 
the sample size of each group, statistical validity was unobtainable. As such, 
the results were maintained in their qualitative format. 
2.3 PROCEDURES 
Group sessions were held in various rooms on the Christchurch College 
of Education campus. The High Cohesion Group met in their lecture room 
after their classes, while the other two groups met in either of two other rooms 
made available by the Christchurch College of Education staff. All sessions 
were video recorded, with the subjects seated cl~sally in a semi-circle where 
they were all clearly visible to the video camera. There were no time 
constraints placed on the duration of the sessions, although the subjects 
were advised that the sessions would take ten to fifteen minutes. In fact the 
average time taken per session was twenty two minutes. However two 
sessions were only thirteen minutes long while another session took forty 
minutes. 
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2.3.1 High Cohesion Group 
The High Cohesion Group met for five experimental sessions and one 
debriefing session. They began their first session with the first application of 
the Group Questionnaire, followed by these instructions, both in a written and 
verbal format: 
The research being undertaken concerns group decision making. 
Over the following meetings you will be presented with one new 
topic to discuss at a time, and for each, you are asked to compile 
a written group statement or recommendation which could be 
given to the appropriate person, be it fellow student, college 
authority or political group. This should be done in an effort to 
firmly express group opinion on this topic, whether this agrees 
with the opinion of the recipient or not. 
The purpose of this session is to develop a list of approximately 
10-15 (or as many as possible) suitable discussion topics. Each 
of the following four meetings will address a different topic, 
selected from this list. Each topic should be something which 
applies not only to the members of the group, but to at least the 
general Christchurch College of Education population, or better 
still, the general population of New Zealand. 
The group was given the chance to ask the experimenter any questions 
they had and then handed a piece of paper, blank except for the heading 
"Discussion Topics". A group discussion proceeded, during which they 
created a list of suitable group discussion topics. 
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Before the second session, this list was compared to a similar list 
compiled by the Low Cohesion Group. Topics which appeared in both lists 
were selected to use as discussion topics for future sessions. This selection 
process ensured the topics used for the experimental sessions were in fact 
considered important and valid by the subjects discussing them. The subjects 
themselves chose the topics that were important to them, thereby ensuring 
there was no reason to debate the choice of topics, and why they were 
labelled as "important". 
Both the High Cohesion Group and the Low Cohesion Group listed as 
discussion topics bulk funding and the presence of a new Japanese business 
school and its students on the Christchurch College of Education campus. As 
these were the only two topics which were mentioned by both groups, it was 
necessary to choose two more topics, each of which appeared on one 
group's list, but not on both. This was done by selecting two issues which it 
was thought would create some difference of opinion within each of the two 
groups. Abortion was listed only by the High Cohesion Group, but was a topic 
which was considered to be likely to create a difference of opinion. Maori 
ownership claims under the Treaty of Waitangi was listed by the Low 
Cohesion Group, and this was a current and controversial issue at the time of 
the study. 
The four topics were then placed in an order the experimenter 
considered most likely to reflect both their abilities to create controversy and 
a difference of opinion within each of the two groups. This was done to give 
the Low Cohesion group the opportunity to increase their level of cohesion as 
the study progressed, and before they discussed a sensitive issue such as 
abortion. The first topic was one on which it was likely that the subjects would 
agree, while the final topic was one on which subjects were likely to hold a 
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range of opinions. The topic presentation order was bulk funding, Japanese 
students on campus, Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi, and abortion. 
Although bulk funding could arguably have been more important than some 
of the other topics to these subjects, it was considered that as they were all 
students they would tend to have similar opinions, and there would be little 
conflict within the group on this issue. 
At the start of the second, third, fourth and fifth sessions, the following 
instructions were given to the group, both in a written and verbal form. The 
asterisks were replaced with the issue selected for discussion in that 
particular session. 
The purpose of this session is to discuss *******. The group is 
required to discuss the issue put before them, and on completion 
of the discussion, to compile a written statement with which all 
group members agree. If no agreement is possible, then simply 
outline the arguments within the group, but do aim for agreement. 
All group members are required to initial this statement, as 
evidence that they agree with it. 
Again, the group was given the opportunity to ask the experimenter any 
questions, and was then handed a piece of paper, blank except for a heading 
of the issue to be discussed. For example, "bulk funding" or "Japanese 
students on campus". At the beginning of the third and fifth sessions, before 
the instructions were given, the group members were again asked to 
complete the Group Questionnaire, to test for any change in group cohesion 
over the course of the study. 
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At the end of the fifth experimental session, it was arranged for the High 
Cohesion Group to meet twenty-four hours later. This session was used to 
administer the Issue Questionnaire, to debrief the subjects about what the 
experimenter had been testing for, and to pay the subjects. All subjects were 
given the opportunity to contact the experimenter if they had any further 
questions, as well as to receive information on the results of the study. The 
Issue Questionnaire was not completed until a day after the final session in 
order to give the subjects time to think over that session. 
2.3.2 Low Cohesion Group 
The Low Cohesion Group experienced exactly the same procedure as 
the High Cohesion Group. These two groups were studied concurrently to 
enable a comparison of their topic lists. There were no differences in the 
experimental procedures of the High Cohesion Group and the Low Cohesion 
Group, and the only difference between the groups was that the subjects in 
the Low Cohesion Group had never met each other previous to the first 
session. 
2.3.3 Non Cohesion Group 
The Non Cohesion Group was formed because of the possibility that the 
Low Cohesion Group would have developed some level of cohesion by the 
fifth session. The discussion of abortion, the final and possibly the most 
controversial topic, could be affected by this potential increase in cohesion. 
The Non Cohesion Group met only once, and their experimental 
environment was the same as for the other two groups. The same Group 
Questionnaire and instructions were given and read to this group as to the 
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other two groups at the beginning of their fifth session. This group also 
completed an Issue Questionnaire and was debriefed the same as the two 
other groups. 
2.4 CODING OF RAW DATA 
All of the group discussion sessions were video recorded, and these 
recordings were then transcribed into a written format. The occurrence of 
groupthink symptoms was measured by comparing each statement made 
during each discussion session to the descriptions of the eight groupthink 
symptoms (Janis & Mann, 1977; Janis, 1982). These were illusions of 
invulnerability, rationalisations of negative information, stereotyping of 
outgroups, assumptions of morality, self censorship, illusions of unanimity, 
mindguarding and direct pressure (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). For 
each session a scoring sheet (Appendix 3) was drawn up to score the number 
of statements made by each group member which fitted the operational 
definition of the symptoms of groupthink (Janis, 1982), as discussed in the 
literature review (Section 1.2.1.2.1 ). 
In order to ascertain whether or not there was an intergroup difference in 
terms of attention and time spent on task, as opposed to time spent in 
discussing irrelevant material, the number of on task and off task statements 
were recorded for each group. To determine the number of on task and off 
task statements made during each discussion, each statement made in all 
sessions, was given a score of between one and five. A score of one required 
the subject to mention either the words in the title of the topic for discussion, or 
to be obviously discussing the topic, for example, to say the words "bulk 
funding" during a statement. A two was scored if the statement was about a 
topic very closely related to the topic under discussion, for example, to 
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discuss individual contracts during the bulk funding session, or to mention the 
name Lockwood Smith (the Minister of Education). A three was for any topic 
getting further away from the task, such as other general educational issues in 
the bulk funding session. A four meant that the group was following a line of 
conversation that was understandable to the bystander, but was in no way 
related to the discussion topic, for example, talking about mutual experiences 
or friendships. A five was given when the statement was a joke, or had no 
relevance to the discussion topic. For example, reference to another group 
members' jewellery. This data was then coded into a scoring sheet similar to 
that used for the groupthink symptoms. 
For each of these coding systems, an inter-rater reliability test was done 
on all the data. This was performed by the researcher and one other masters 
thesis student, who each individually encoded all the data and then 
compared the results. The average reliability was 84.25%, and varied from 
symptom to symptom. Stereotyping and direct pressure each scored 91 % 
reliability, while self censorship scored 89%. Collective rationalisation was 
scored to 86% reliability between raters, while inherit morality was scored to 
84% and mindguarding to 81 %. The illusion of invulnerability was only 
scored to 77% accuracy and the illusion of unanimity to 75%. For the on and 
off task data, the average inter rater reliability was 87%, and ranged from 82% 
for group two (session four) to 91 % in group three (session five). 
2.5 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The aim of the study was to determine. if significant differences would 
occur between the various groups which had various levels of cohesiveness. 
The methodological approach adopted initially was qualitative. However, due 
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to sample size, it became necessary to adopt a qualitative statistical approach 
in analysing the data. Anova's and t-tests as well as Tukey HSD were used. 
CHAPTER 3 
Results 
3.1 GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE 
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The results for this section are summarised in Figure. 2. Group one had 
a mean questionnaire score for the first session of 6.02 (where 7.0 is the best 
possible score). This increased to 6.11 by the third application of the 
questionnaire. Although there was a higher score for the fifth session than for 
the first, this was not to a level of statistical significance when analysed using 
an ANOVA (1, F= 0.25, p< .62). 
Group two had a mean score of 4.06 for the first application of the group 
questionnaire which rose significantly to a mean of 5.28 by the fifth session (2, 
F=20.42, p< .001 ). For the first session group one's score was significantly 
higher than group two's, when measured by an unpaired t-test (t=B.17, p< 
.001 ). 
The use of a repeated measures ANOVA for all the questionnaire data 
for groups one and two, highlighted a significant difference in answers to the 
group questionnaire (1, F=75.86, p< .001 ). These results are from all 
sessions combined, and show that on average, group one displayed higher 
group questionnaire scores than did group two. 
In each of their first sessions, group one (session one) and group three 
(session five) were significantly different from each other (1, F=140.33, p< 
.0001 ). Group two session two and group three session five (mean score 
3. 78) were not significantly different (t=1.09, p<.28). 
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In the fifth and final session, the means of 6.11 for group one, 5.28 for 
group two and 3. 78 for group three showed a significant difference (2, 
F=59.27, p< .001 ). Group one had a significantly higher questionnaire score 
than group two (1, F=17.31, p< .0001 ). Group one was also significantly 
higher scoring than group three (1, F=i 43.98, p< .0001 ). Group two in turn 
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Figure 2. Mean scores for group questionnaire. 
3.1.1 Results By Question 
An assessment of the questions highlighted the differences between 
group one and group two (Appendix 1 ). The questions 7 (t=3.81, p< .006), 8 
(t=3.31, p< .01 ), 11 (t=10.61, p< .001 ), 12 (t=4.28, P< .003), and 13 (t=22.04, 
p< .001) were scored significantly differently between groups one and two at 
the first application of the questionnaire. 
The mean score for group one in question seven ("I would tell members 
of this group some personal information about myself") was 6.2, a value that is 
significantly higher that the score of 3.5 for group two (t=3.81, p< .006). For 
question eight ("I would tell members of this group private, confidential 
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information about myself") group one again scored higher than group two, 
with a mean score of 5.4 compared to 2. 75 respectively (t=3.31, p< .01 ). 
Group one's mean score of 6.6 for question 11 ("I have enjoyed my previous 
contact with this group"), was significantly higher than group two's mean 
score of 4.0 (t=10.61, p< .001 ). For question 12 ("I would wish to see the other 
group members outside this group") group one's score of 6.4 was significantly 
higher than the score of 3.75 gained by group two (t=4.28, p< .003). Finally, 
question 13 ("I have known the other group members previous to this 
meeting") was also scored higher by group one with a mean score of 6.4, a 
significant increase on the score of 1.0 for group two (t=22.04, P< .001 ). 
Only question 13 was significantly different at the second completion of 
the questionnaire, when group one scored 6.2 compared to 2.8 scored by 
group two (t=6.43, p< .002). In the third application of the questionnaire, there 
were no significant differences based on individual questions. No questions 
other than those described here displayed any significant difference between 
any of the groups. 
3.2 ISSUE QUESTIONNAIRE 
There was a general trend within group two of higher rates of self-
disclosure than group one. In group one, two of the group members reported 
withholding information from the group discussion, while no members of 
group two withheld information. Simultaneously, all members of group one 
specified any disagreement they had with the group position. In group three 
only three of the group members raised their disagreements. 
In all groups, the majority of group members had previously discussed 
the four topics, usually with their friends. In group two, two members had 
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discussed the topics after the sessions again with their friends. Group two 
however did not admit to uncovering any new information. 
Members of group one had previously discussed only the issues about 
Japanese students (one subject) and abortion (three subjects). However, by 
the completion of the study they had discussed the other issues with other 
members of the group (Table 1.a.). They commented that such discussions 
had revealed the other group members' opinions, some of which had 
surprised individuals. One group member reported that the discussion had 
made him think more about abortion. Three group members had found out 
information they had not previously known. 
Although members of group two claimed not to have withheld any 
information, one group member did admit to disagreeing with a position the 
group took and not saying so. Likewise the members of group one claimed to 
have not disagreed and kept quiet, but then one admitted to not completely 
agreeing with one decision. 
Group three was apparently even more open than group two. All five group 
members claimed to have always agreed with the group outcome, but two 
admitted to withholding information, and also disagreeing with a group 
opinion and not saying so. In addition, only three claimed to have verbally 
stated their disagreement, compared to all five of group one, and four of group 
two (Table 1. b.). 
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Table 1. a. Issue questionnaire summary of numbers of responses to items. 
Group one Group two Group three 































































Table 1. b. Issue questionnaire summary of numbers for responses for all 
three groups. 
Group one Group two Group three 
Question 2. c. If you discussed any of the issues following the group meetings, 
did you discover anything you did not know? 
3 Yes O Yes O Yes 
Question 3. During any session, did you know any information you withheld? 
2 Yes O Yes 2 Yes 
Question 4. Did you disagree with the group at any time, but not say so? 
O Yes 1 Yes 2 Yes 
Question 5. Did you agree with all the group's positions? 
4 Yes 5 Yes 5 Yes 
Question 6. Did you disagree with the group at any time, and say so? 
5 Yes 2 Yes 3 Yes 
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3.3 GROUPTHINK SYMPTOMS 
To enable an ease of reading in the following figures, the groupthink 
symptoms are frequently referenced by number. In all cases, they are the 
illusion of invulnerability (symptom one); the rationalisation of negative 
information (two); the stereotyping of outgroups (three); inherent morality 
(four); self censorship (five); the illusion of unanimity (six); mindguarding 
(seven); and direct pressure (eight). 
There was a significant difference in the occurrence of groupthink 
symptoms between groups one and two. For example, group two 
consistently exhibited more groupthink symptoms than group one. The mean 
number of groupthink symptoms displayed in group two, per session was 3.45 
instances of each symptom per group member per session, whereas the 
mean for group one was 1.24. The results were in the opposite direction of 
those expected, and were significantly different between the two groups (1, 
F=29.80, p<.0001 ). 
In session two the members of group one displayed a mean score of 
0.95 when all the groupthink symptoms were added together, while group two 
displayed 3.83 symptoms (Table 2). This was a significant difference 
between the two groups in an unpaired t-test (t=1.97, p<. 05). Group one did 
not show a significant difference, from session two to session five. The mean 
score only increased from 0.95 to 1.43. Each of group one's sessions 
showed the following number of symptoms (from the most to the least); 
session three (Japanese students) 2.23; session five (abortion) 1.43; session 
two (Bulk funding (0.95); and session four (Maori ownership) 0.35. 
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Table 2. Mean number of each groupthink symptom per group member per 
session. 
Session number Group one 
2. Bulk funding 0.95 
3. Japanese students 















Group two also did not show a significant difference in the number of 
symptoms they displayed from sessions two to five. In order of greatest to 
least, group two displayed 5.08 symptoms for session four (Maori ownership); 
3.83 for session two (bulk funding); 2.6 in session five (abortion); and 2.3 in 
session three (Japanese students). See Figure 3. 
Bulk funding (1, F=18.31, P< .001) and Maori ownership (1, F=49.47, p< 
.001) were the only session topics which revealed a significant difference 
between groups one and two. There was no significant difference between 
group one and group two in the number of groupthink symptoms displayed in 
sessions three (Japanese students on campus) and five (abortion). 
Group three scored a mean of 1.7 groupthink symptoms. This was not 
significantly different from group two (mean of 3.83) or group one (mean of 
0.95) at session two. None of the three groups was significantly different from 
each other in the number of groupthink symptoms they displayed in session 
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Figure 3. Mean score of symptom by group and session. 







Both group one and group two recorded symptom three (stereotyping of 
outgroups), as the most frequently occurring groupthink symptom. (Figure 4, 
Table 3). This scored a mean of 8.95 combined, The next most frequent 
symptom was the rationalisation of negative information (symptom two) with a 
mean of 3.35, followed by symptom eight direct pressure with a mean of 2.22. 
Symptom four (morality), with a mean score of 2.08 was the fourth most 
common. Stereotyping was significantly more frequent than any other 
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IE1 per person per session 
Figure 4. Mean score for each symptom for groups one and two combined, all 
sessions. 
When groupthink symptoms were analysed individually there were 
significant differences between groups one and two. Rationalisation (6.1 for 
group one compared to 0.6 for group two), stereotyping (14.15 compared to 
3. 75) and morality ( 3.65 compared to 0.5) occurred more frequently in group 
two than in group one. Direct pressure (3.35 compared to 1.1) was recorded 
significantly more often in group one than in group two. The rationalisation of 
negative information (1, F=23.01, p< .001 ), stereotyping of outgroups (1, 
82.29, p< .001 ), morality (1, t=7.549, p< .008), and direct pressure (1, 3.85, p< 
.05) were all significantly different between groups one and two over all 
sessions, and these four were the only symptoms to be scored to a level of 
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Figure 5. Symptom occurrence over all sessions of group one and group two. 
An analysis of session five showed all three cohesion groups display 
different amounts of each symptom. It can be seen that stereotyping (2, 
F=10.317, p< .001) and direct pressure (2, F=16.56, P< .001) were the only 
two symptoms that showed a significant difference between the three groups. 
All three groups were statistically different (2, F=5. 78, p< .001 ). While 
symptoms one (illusion of invulnerability) and seven (mindguarding) hardly 
occur at all, the remaining six symptoms occurred at low levels, with no 
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Figure 6. Mean score by symptom for all groups in session five. 
3.3.2 SYMPTOM OCCURRENCE RATES 
The illusion of invulnerability (symptom one) hardly occurred in any of 
the three groups. Of the four times it was recorded, three times were by group 
two and once was by group three. Group three was the only group to score 
any instances of it in the fifth session. 
The lack of inherent morality was another symptom which occurred with 
greater frequency in group two than in group one. Group two scored 71 
instances overall, while group one scored only seven. Group three's score of 
two in the final session was similar to group two's score of one. 
The rationalisation of negative information was another symptom that 
occurred with a higher frequency in group two than in group one. As already 
mentioned, this was one of the few symptoms that did distinguish between the 
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two groups at any level of significance, with group two having an overall score 
of 121. This score was in part the product of a score of 84 in session four, and 
20 in session five, each of these subtotals being larger than group one's 
overall total of 12. Group three also scored highly on this symptom, with a 
score of 10. 
Group two scored more highly on stereotyping than on any other 
symptom, with 273 instances recorded. This was significantly greater than the 
75 scored by group one, and the one instance scored by group three. In their 
fifth sessions, group one scored seven while group two scored 32. 
Individual self censorship affected all three groups. Group one scored 
23 instances over the four sessions, and despite a sharp increase in session 
three, maintained an average of 3.3 for the three sessions. Group two 
increased their instances from one in the first session to seven in the fifth. 
Group three however exhibited a relatively high 12 instances which was their 
highest score. 
The illusion of unanimity was more frequent in group two than in group 
one, but not to a level of significance. However it was the third most common 
symptom for group three. Group one had a total score of five with no instances 
of this symptom in this group's final session. Group two's total score was 19, 
of which 11 occurred in the final session. Group three scored seven 
instances. 
In their first session group one scored 43 statements which were 
categorised as examples of direct pressure. This was group one's second 
most frequent symptom, with a score of 65. This result was significantly higher 
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than that of group. Of the 22 cases recorded for this group, 16 emerged from 
the fifth session. Group three scored two, one of the lower scores. 
In session five, group one and group three expressed no cases of 
mindguarding whereas group two displayed two. 
When the transcripts of the sessions were analysed, mindguarding was 
a very infrequent symptom. No instances of mindguarding were present 
within group three and group one for session five. In contrast group two 
displayed two instances during session five. Group one scored a total of eight 
instances, and group two scored 12. 
In session five, group one and group three expressed no cases of 
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Table 3. Symptom by group by session 
Symptom Group one Group two Group three 
1 . Invulnerability 0,0,0,0 2,0, 1,0 1 
total 0 3 
2. Rationalisation 2, 7,0,3 10, 7,84,20 10 
total 12 121 
3. Stereotyping 15,46, 7, 7 122,47, 72,32 1 
total 75 273 
4. Morality 2, 4, 0, 1 1 2, 26, 1 7, 1 6 2 
total 7 71 
5. Self censorship 3, 13,4,3 1, 4, 7, 7 12 
total 23 19 
6. Unanimity 1, 1, 3, 0 1, 5, 2, 11 7 
total 5 19 
7. Mindguarding 5,3,0,0 3, 1,6,2 0 
total 8 12 
8. Direct Pressure 8, 14,0,43 0, 1,5, 16 2 
total 65 22 
SESSION TOTALS 36,88, 14,57 151, 91, 194, 104 35 
195 540 
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3.4 ON/OFF TASK DATA 
The higher the score on the On/Off data the more time the group spent 
off task. The difference between the scores of group one and group two was 
not significant. There was no significant change for either group one or group 
two in relation to session two and five. By session five, the only significant 
difference between groups was that group two (mean score 28.16) was more 
frequently off task than group three, with a mean score of 13.88 (2, 3.71, p< 
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Figure 8. Mean number of off task scores per group. 






The general trend between groups one and two was similar, despite a 
range of written comments (Figure 9). Group two consistently developed 
more written comments than group one. This trend between the two groups 
remained constant. 
For the first .session, group two suggested 34 possible discussion topics. 
These proved to be less controversial topics than those chosen by group one. 
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For example, group two suggested student allowances, Maori issues 
(remembering that all the members of group two were European), and 
lowering the drinking age. Group one suggested homosexual law reform, 
Christianity, and euthanasia (Appendix 4). For their first session, group one 
suggested 24 topics, six of which were not serious, but rather ingroup jokes. 
For example, "Does John produce clones?", the end of the world, and "the 
void" (Appendix 4). 
The second session, revealed the greatest differences between group's 
one and two. For example, group one raised six points about bulk funding, 
while group two had 25 points about the same topic. In session five groups 
two and three expressed a similar number of comments (9 and 8 
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Figure 9. Written comments for each group in each session. 
l!I Group 1 
.. ....... 5........ Group 2 
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The time of completion for each session varied from group to group. 
Group three took .the longest time to complete their session, taking 40 minutes 
and 11 seconds, while in sessions three and four group one took a mere 13 
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minutes and 48 seconds and 13 minutes and 37 seconds respectively. In 
general, group two took longer than group one to complete each session. 
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The present study investigated two hypotheses. The first, was that 
the level of group cohesion would have a significant effect on the 
occurrence of groupthink symptoms. The second hypothesis was that the 
topic under discussion would have a significant effect on the occurrence 
of groupthink symptoms. 
The results strongly support the existence of an effect of group 
cohesion on groupthink. However they are in opposition to Janis's 
(1982) predictions. In addition the results regarding the discussion issue 
were somewhat inconclusive. In summation, the present study provided 
strong support for the first hypothesis and some support for the second. 
Before addressing these results it was essential to test the groups for the 
expected levels of group cohesion (refer to methods section). 
4.1 Cohesion 
The present study contradicts previous findings about the 
relationship between cohesion and group performance. In the literature, 
there has been support for a positive relationship between the two. The 
present findings were that the High Cohesion Group did not create more 
recommended discussion topics than the low and non cohesive groups. 
This was in contrast to Cohen et al. (1960) who found that cohesive 
groups produced more ideas than non cohesive groups. It was also in 
contrast to numerous researchers who found cohesion to increase the 
productivity of work groups. (Dailey, 1977; Evans & Dion, 1991; George 
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& Bettenhausen, 1990; Greene, 1989; Mikalachki, 1969; Seashore, 1952; 
Summers et al., 1988). 
Stodgill (1972) suggested that a cohesive group diverted their time 
into social behaviour and away from task behaviour. This finding was 
replicated in the present study. The generation of group discussion 
topics resulted in group one suggesting six frivolous topics (one quarter 
of all their recommendations) while group two did not recommend any. 
This is a good example of the different emphasis the two groups placed 
on the first session. 
Judging from the above explanation, group one should have 
displayed a greater number of off task behaviours than group two. 
However this was not the case. The results were not as anticipated. 
There are two factors that may have influenced this result. Firstly the 
comments were coded on a five point scale, which may have excessively 
segmented the results. A three or even two point scale may have found a 
significant difference on this measure, and would be preferable in future 
research of this type. Secondly, group two had much longer discussion 
sessions than group one. This situation alone would be a factor both in 
the number of off task statements and the number of written statements 
created. Interestingly there were distinctive group differences in the 
content of the off topic comments. For example, group one discussed 
intragroup material, while group two tended to discuss more general 
matters. 
A possible explanation for the lack of enhanced performance in the 
High Cohesion Group was the goal setting of each group (Bernthal & 
Insko, 1993; Hagstrom & Selvin, 1965). It appears that the High 
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Cohesion Group in this study had a group goal of enjoyment and money 
earning. In contrast, the Low Cohesion Group appeared to be more 
concerned with the achievement of the task at hand. This visible 
difference in the number of suggestions provided by each group, may be 
the best reflection of the different goal each group had set itself. 
The suggestion of an optimal point in the cohesion/productivity 
relationship is supported within this study (Fisher, 1974). A group can be 
either too cohesive or not cohesive enough to experience an optimal 
relationship. In the present study group two performed to the highest 
level of all three groups, when that performance was measured by the 
number of suggested topics or the number of written comments created 
per session. The Low Cohesion Group produced more ideas, was more 
task focused, and spent more time on the decision process than the High 
Cohesion Group. Although they also exhibited more off task comments, 
the number of these comments is not in line with the time taken to 
complete the task. In terms of percentage of time spent on or off task, the 
results may be the reverse. 
Although not directly measured, the two groups within the present 
study appear to display different types of cohesion (Bernthal & Insko, 
1993; Drescher et al., 1985; Hagstrom & Selvin, 1965; Mikalachki, 1969; 
Zaccaro & Lowe, 1987). Group one was self created, spent their leisure 
time together, and had a selection of intragroup jokes. Simultaneously 
they displayed elements of both social and task cohesion. A reason for 
this was that the group had originated to achieve tasks set by the 
Christchurch College Of Education. 
71 
In comparison, groups two and three exhibited task orientated 
cohesion. Their formation was for the purpose of the experimental 
procedure. Because of the above, group one had different goals to 
those of group two and group three (social versus task satisfaction). The 
above could be used to explain why the different forms of cohesion 
displayed by the experimental groups resulted in certain trends. For 
example, as a highly task orientated group, group two had longer 
discussion sessions and created more written comments than did group 
one. 
4.1.2 Group Cohesion Differences 
The results indicated that the three groups were indeed different in 
the amount of cohesion they displayed. An examination of the two 
questionnaires used depicts this finding. The group questionnaire gave 
overwhelming support for the presence of different cohesion levels within 
the three groups. Group one had much higher levels of cohesion than 
either group two or group three. Group one also received substantially 
higher scores than group two at the first session, with an average score 
of 6.02. This indicates that group one had a high level of cohesion prior to 
undertaking any experimental sessions. This group was therefore 
naturally cohesive and did not require an experimental manipulation to 
give the appearance of cohesion. This group was chosen for the study 
on that basis. 
Group one maintained its high cohesion score through to the fifth 
session, although its cohesion level did not increase. Both of group 
one's first and fifth session scores were significantly higher than the 
scores for group two. Group two began the sessions with a score of only 
4.06, which was clearly below that of group one. Unlike group one, there 
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was a significant increase in group two's cohesion scores over the 
course of the study. Despite this increase, group two did not achieve the 
same cohesion level of group one. The rise in group two's cohesion is 
quite remarkable considering that in total it existed for less than four 
hours. 
The visible increase in the cohesion scores for group two can be 
explained by the "false cohesion" effect described by Longley and Pruitt 
(1980). They argued that apparent cohesion sometimes occurred early 
in the life of a group and acted to give the impression of a cohesive 
group. This effect occurred when the group did not experience an 
intimate relationship such as Janis (1982) definition of cohesion required. 
Arguably, the concept of false cohesion offers a valid explanation as to 
why authors have not focused on high cohesion in the performance of 
group tasks. In these studies, false cohesion may have developed very 
early in the history of the group, with the researcher accepting this 
apparent cohesion as genuine. 
The members of groups which display false cohesion may make 
incorrect assumptions about each other and even break unspoken rules 
in their interactions. This effect was visible within group two. The 
members of group two appeared cautious about expressing any 
controversial ideas, while the members of group three were even more 
reluctant. 
False cohesion may also explain how some researchers have 
managed to create cohesive groups, by the manipulation of subjects into 
short term groups. It is not until one of these artificially created groups is 
compared to the cohesion of a real world group such as group one, that 
the difference in the cohesion levels of each is perceivable. This finding 
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clearly displays the pitfalls of using a manipulated group. This 
methodological failing is the main reason the relationship between 
cohesion and groupthink is still debated. In addition it must be noted that 
although group two was not manipulated, it was created for the purpose 
of this study. 
The results of groups one and two emphasize the methodological 
shortcomings of previous research which has attempted to manipulate 
cohesion. As these two groups had significantly different cohesion levels 
after five discussion sessions, it appears impossible for a group to 
develop a cohesion level in one session which provides an adequate test 
of Janis's (1982) theory. However this has not stopped several 
researchers from using this method (Berkowitz, 1954; Kroon, Krevelo & 
Rabbie, 1992; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1987). 
In their first experimental sessions, group two and group three each 
had cohesion levels that suggested they came from the same population. 
It can therefore be assumed that the results of group three in session five 
are similar to the results group two would have obtained for the same 
topic if they had discussed it first. The different cohesion levels for each 
group in the fifth session, the discussion of abortion, shows that attempts 
to observe three different levels of cohesion for this session were 
successful. That group one was significantly different from the two other 
groups in session five has already been mentioned. This result therefore 
supports the experimental assumption the groups were high, low and 
non cohesive as expected. 
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4.1.3 Cohesion Differences By Question 
When the group questionnaire was assessed, an interesting trend 
emerged among the individual questions. A common theme was the 
willingness to express personal information within the group, and this 
was evident in the answers to questions 7 and 8. In the first session 
these two questions were scored more highly by the first group than by 
the second. This result supported the findings of Peteroy (1983) and 
Stokes et al. (1983), both of whom found that members of cohesive 
groups were more willing to disclose confidential information about 
themselves than were members of non cohesive groups. 
In the present study, the tone of the discussions was certainly more 
intimate within group one than group two. The one factor which 
ultimately differentiated between groups one and two was the group 
members tendency to confide in the group as a unit. This was the most 
important factor that distinguished between the High Cohesion Group 
and group two, (the Low Cohesion Group}, which displayed false 
cohesion. 
Similarity as a variable of cohesion was not corroborated by the 
answers to question five ("The members of this group have similar 
opinions to me"). This is contrary to the idea that the similarity of group 
members is a key factor in cohesion (Good & Nelson, 1971; Lott & Lott, 
1965; Szilagyi & Wallace, 1983, in Summers et al., 1988; Zander, 1979). 
Questions 1, 2 and 3, tested the concept of the group member's attraction 
to the group. Again, the results for these questions were surprising, as 
there was no differentiation between the groups (Cartwright, 1968; 
Drescher, Burlingham & Fuhriman, 1985; Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1987; 
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Johnson, 1981; Lott, 1961; Mikalachki, 1969; Wheeless et al., 1982). 
Although the sample sizes for this study are insufficient to permit 
generalization of the findings, the attraction to group definition of 
cohesion was certainly not supported. 
In addition, the answers to Questions 4, 6 and 9 which dealt with 
the closeness of the group as a whole (the field of forces definition of 
cohesion), did not discriminate between groups one and two as 
expected. Again caution is required when generalising from these 
results due to the small number of subjects. However, these findings 
failed to provide support for the "field of forces definition of cohesion 
(Festinger, 1950; Piper et al., 1983; Piper et al., 1984; Schachter et al., 
1968). Simultaneously the present conclusions do not corroborate past 
research which also suggests that concepts such as "bondedness" 
(Mudrack, 1989; Piper et al., 1984) "solidarity" (Mudrack, 1989; Wheeless 
et al., 1982), "we-ness" (Forsyth, 1990; Libo, 1953; Owen, 19485) and 
"group spirit" ( Fisher, 1974; Owen, 1985; Staw, 1975; Stogdill, 1972) 
indicate cohesion. 
Furthermore a feeling of active involvement (question ten) was not 
found to distinguish a cohesive group from a non cohesive group. This 
was despite findings to the contrary by Bollen and Hoyle (1990), Bugen 
(1977), and Good and Nelson (1971 ). The group members' level of 
activity within group interactions did not impact on their perception of 
group cohesiveness. 
Questions 11 ("I have enjoyed my previous contact with this group") 
and 13 ("I have known the other members of this group previous to this 
meeting") were used to obtain some of the information necessary to 
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select group one. These questions were completely biographical. 
Further measures of the history of the group were contained within 
questions 14, 15, and 16 which requested biographical data on the 
length of time the group members had known each other. 
4.1.4 Issue Experience 
The members of group two were more honest in their discussions 
than were the members of group one. This can be seen by the answers 
each group gave to the issue questionnaire. This finding is contrary to 
that of the previous section. In the above section, the High Cohesion 
Group was more comfortable discussing intimate information within the 
group than were the two groups with lower cohesion levels. An 
explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the task before the 
groups. The experimental task of the groups did not require the 
expression of personal information, only issue relevant information. Any 
confidential information which was revealed was done spontaneously 
and without experimental prompt. This occurred with greater regularity in 
group one, although the members of group two were more honest in 
expressing their task relevant opinions. 
In contrast to the above, Janis (1982) would have expected the 
High Cohesion Group to more readily express their opinions on the issue 
at hand than the Low Cohesion Group. The results of the present study 
lead to the reverse conclusion. Instead of group members feeling 
comfortable and confident enough to be honest with their friends, they 
have appeared more reserved within a cohesive group. ,Maybe the 
strength of the group opinion is too strong for them to challenge. The 
power the group has over them in the long term, reduces the group 
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members ability to deviate from the group position. A conclusion to be 
drawn here is that since the Low Cohesion Group had no capacity to 
reprimand its members, these members had greater freedom to express 
themselves. However, in a completely non cohesive group, the group 
members are tentatively testing the reactions their suggestions draw, and 
are hesitant in their verbalised comments. This is one example of the 
Low Cohesion Group performing at a superior level to the High Cohesion 
Group. 
Group two initially devised substantially more topics than did group 
one. They also created a great deal more written suggestions for each 
discussion topic. Interestingly the topics each group suggested were of 
a different nature. The topics suggested by group two were less 
controversial than were those suggested by group one (Appendix 4). 
Whereas group one recommended topics such as abortion, Christianity, 
legalising marijuana and euthanasia, group two suggested Maori issues 
(remembering that all of the group members were European), student 
allowances and bulk funding. Although these are only examples, there 
was a tendency for group two to suggest issues that would permit a 
consensus. The members of group two appear to have been careful not 
to suggest topics that would offend their fellow group members, or cause 
them to enter into a situation where they would come into conflict. 
These findings correspond with the above conclusions, as the 
discussion topics were selected in the first session. Group two were 
cautious not to offend the other group members before they got to know 
them. This is comparable with the finding that group three attempted to 
maintain intragroup stability by not arguing during their session, and 
taking a moderate stance on abortion. Hence, there is further evidence of 
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a false cohesion effect occurring in group two. Whereas group one was 
cohesive and group three was not, group two had some level of 
cohesion. To the casual observer they may appear to match the 
behaviour exhibited by a highly cohesive group but this form of analysis 
suggests otheiwise. 
4.2 Groupthink Symptoms 
The first hypothesis was supported by the results. The level of 
cohesion did have a significant effect on the occurrence of groupthink 
symptoms. This result was found to be in opposition to Janis (1982), 
since the Low Cohesion Group experienced more groupthink symptoms 
than the High Cohesion Group. This result coincided with the findings of 
the majority of research which has tested the groupthink theory 
(Callaway & Esser, 1984; Leana, 1985; Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Moorhead 
& Montanari, 1986). Further, not all of the eight symptoms of groupthink 
have been supported in the present study (Hensley and Griffin, 1986; 
Manz and Sims, 1982; Montanari and Moorhead, 1989). 
4.2.1 Cohesion Based Groupthink Differences 
Despite attempts to recreate Janis's antecedent conditions, this 
finding has been consistent throughout research on groupthink theory 
(Leana, 1985; Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). As 
already mentioned. the use of groups most accurately described as 
displaying false cohesion, has lead to a lack of support for the theory in 
general. 
79 
Group two achieved the highest groupthink score for each session, 
and consistently maintained higher frequencies of groupthink than did 
group one. Figure 3 shows the scores for group one and group two are a 
mirror image of each other. For the sessions in which group one 
received a relatively high score, group two scored relatively low. At no 
time did group one achieve a higher score than group two, while over 
sessions two to five the difference in the scores was marked. This result 
likewise opposes Janis's (1982) predictions, but not the findings of other 
researchers (Leana, 1985; Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Moorhead & 
Montanari, 1986). Group one's low frequency of groupthink symptoms is 
placed in perspective by the fact that in three out of four sessions they 
displayed fewer symptoms of groupthink than did group three in session 
five. 
These findings provide support for Fisher (1974) who suggested 
that cohesion and performance had a curvilinear relationship. As 
cohesion increased so did performance, before it plateaued, and then 
decreased. This theory explains the finding of the present study, as 
group one consistently produced fewer written comments than group two. 
Therefore group one may have exceeded the optimal point of cohesion, 
and thus been less productive than group two. 
Although group one increased the number of groupthink symptoms 
they displayed between sessions two and five, there was not a consistent 
pattern over the four sessions. The pattern of group two also varied, but 
as already noted, was in opposition to the pattern of group one. Although 
neither group one or group two changed the number of groupthink 
symptoms they displayed over time, they were different from each other. 
Group three was also different from group two in group two's fifth session. 
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The conclusion derived is that cohesion did influence the occurrence of 
groupthink. 
4.2.2 Groupthink Symptoms 
Having determined that there was indeed a difference in the 
number of groupthink symptoms each group displayed, the next issue 
that needs to be addressed is the question of which symptoms were the 
most frequent. 
Again there is a clear answer. Stereotyping was by far the most 
common symptom across all three groups, and of all measures taken. 
This finding agrees with Hensley and Griffin (1986) and Manz and Sims 
(1982), who also found evidence of stereotyping as a key symptom within 
groupthink. The second most frequent symptom within the present study 
was the rationalisation of negative information, which has also been 
previously supported in the literature (Hensley & Griffin 1986; Manz & 
Sims, 1982; Montanari & Moorhead, 1989). The third most frequent 
symptom was direct pressure (Hensley & Griffin, 1986; Manz & Sims, 
1982). Previous studies have also found support for the importance of 
self censorship, morality and the illusion of invulnerability. However 
these symptoms were not frequently found within the present study 
(Hensley & Griffin, 1986, Manz & Sims, 1982; Montanari & Moorhead, 
1989). For example, the illusion of invulnerability was supported by both 
Terborg et al. (1976) and Thompson and Carsud (1976, in Callaway & 
Esser, 1984) was a symptom which rarely occurred within the present 
study. 
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Significantly group two displayed more rationalization, stereotyping 
and morality behaviours than group one. However, group one displayed 
more direct pressure than group two. That group one made use of direct 
pressure indicates that consensus was important for this group, and 
members who did not conform to the group norm were placed under 
pressure until they did. The continuity of the intragroup relations, made 
the use of direct pressure more acceptable. Pressure was applied to low 
status group members in order to maintain group consensus. 
4.2.3 Symptom By Symptom 
Although supported by previous research (Hensley & Griffin, 1986; 
Montanari & Moorhead, 1989; Terborg et al., 1976; Thompson & Carsud, 
1976, in Callaway & Esser, 1984), the illusion of invulnerability was not 
found to have importance in the present study. In fact this symptom 
hardly occurred at all in any of the three groups. The experimental 
design may have affected the visibility of the illusion of invulnerability. 
This is one symptom more likely to occur within the political arena than 
elsewhere. However, as the occurrences of the illusion of invulnerability 
were extremely low, it appears likely that this is a valid finding. 
A lack of concern for moral and ethical dilemmas caused by the 
group's chosen course of action, is known as a lack of inherent morality. 
Group two obtained their third highest score for this symptom and scored 
significantly higher than group one. In contrast, group three's score for 
this symptom was one of their lowest. The relative absence of a lack of 
morality did not lie with the discussion topics, as there were no changes 
within the groups between sessions. That the symptom of inherent 
morality did not occur more frequently within the discussion of abortion 
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than in any other session, gives support to the evidence that this is not an 
important symptom within the groupthink theory (Longley & Pruitt, 1980). 
Stereotyping behaviour was characterised by simplistic and 
negative assumptions of the outgroup. Why stereotyping behaviour 
occurred so frequently in group two is not completely clear. It appears 
that this group considered itself above moral criticism, however the 
group members may have not seriously considered actioning their 
recommendations. This result supports those researchers who have 
found that although groupthink may occur, it is more common in low 
cohesion groups than in groups with high levels of cohesion. This result 
further refutes Janis (1982) assumptions. Possibly the high number of 
stereotyping comments made by group two was an attempt at increasing 
the cohesion within the group. Normal thought processes may have 
been responsible for making stereotyping the most frequent symptom. A 
natural tendency to categorise people was expanded in order to 
establish to whether the group members shared the same opinions. 
Group two's high score on the stereotyping symptom could be due 
to an attempt at bonding within the group. By verbalizing common 
assumptions, group members may have increased their cohesion level. 
Within group one stereotyping was not required, as the group members 
already knew each others attitudes. Despite this assumption, the 
abortion discussion did bring out some opinions which surprised the 
other members of group one. Simultaneously, group three had never 
previously met and were uncertain of the reactions other group members 
would have towards controversial statements. An interesting trend was 
for group two to make more stereotyped statements in the second, rather 
than the final session. This could be due to the fact that the relatively new 
83 
group was discussing bulk funding, a topic on which they would almost 
certainly agree. This near certain agreement on the discussion topic 
enhanced the stereotyping behaviour of the group. In this situation, 
group bonding could easily occur as the group members found they had 
a common opinion. 
One symptom which divided the three groups was the collective 
rationalization of negative information. This occurred in order to prevent 
the groups preferred alternative solution being discredited. This 
symptom rarely occurred within group three, occurring with only half of 
the frequency with which it occurred in group two. Over all five sessions, 
group two displayed more examples of this symptom than did group one, 
with a frequency second only to that of stereotyping. The difference 
between groups one and two for rationalization was huge, and in the 
region of 9:1. But why was this symptom so prevalent in group two? One 
explanation for this effect is that the members of group two attempted to 
appear involved in the discussion, but avoided creating any disturbance. 
Thus, they phrased their opinions in a manner consistent with 
rationalization. For example, members of group two would frequently 
make a point and then make a comment which rationalized what they 
had just said. Rationalization has previously received support within 
groupthink research (Hensley & Griffin, 1986; Manz & Sims, 1982; 
Montanari & Moorhead, 1989), however in the present study it decreased 
as the cohesion levels rose. 
The illusion of unanimity was another infrequent symptom. The 
actual scores for this symptom were very low because it was not easy to 
score from individual comments. The illusion of unanimity was said to 
occur when one group member was silent for a period of time, or 
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developed a pattern of non committal responses, such as "mm" and 
"yeah" only when pressured to respond. The results of the present study 
regarding the occurrence of the illusion of unanimity agreed with the 
findings of Manz and Sims (1982). The only other support for this 
symptom within the groupthink model comes from case studies similar to 
those used by Janis (1982), which have already been shown to be 
inadequate. The illusion of unanimity has not commonly been supported 
in the literature, and in the present study it was more prevalent in the 
Low and Non Cohesion Groups than in the High Cohesion Group. This 
was a particularly common symptom within group two, as the members of 
this group frequently lapsed into periods of endless "mmm's" without any 
real confirmation. 
Within groups one and two, self censorship behaviour was 
recorded infrequently. The fact that it was the most common symptom for 
group three is however important. The present study found that self 
censorship occurred with greater frequency in the lower cohesion groups 
than in the High Cohesion Group (Hensley & Griffin, 1986; Manz & Sims, 
1982; Montanari & Moorhead, 1989). It also occurred more frequently 
when all group members publicly announced their agreement with the 
group position, as opposed to their private agreement. 
Direct pressure was applied to group members when they 
expressed doubts related to the dominant group position. In group one, 
most of the direct pressure came from the dominant group "leader" and 
was directed at one group member in particular. This was the only case 
where group one scored a significantly higher frequency of any symptom 
than group two. The presence of this symptom as one of the 
characteristics of groupthink was supported in Hensley and Griffin (1986) 
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and Manz and Sims (1982). Marked differences also appeared between 
groups one and two in the present study. Within both group one and 
group two, the greatest frequency of direct pressure was in session five. 
Once one opinion dominated the conversation, the groups actively 
discouraged further discussion through the use of direct pressure. 
This conclusion was represented in the dynamics of group one. 
This group had a clear structure and hierarchy, with one member who 
was more conservative than the rest. As a result, when this group 
member raised any opposition it was quickly squashed by more 
dominant group members. Arguably, this may not be a group dynamics 
statement, but rather a comment on the cohesion process. That is, as a 
group increases its cohesion, a hierarchy develops within the group and 
low status members cannot challenge those higher in the hierarchy. 
Finally, the symptom of mindguarding which related to the 
prevention of disruptive information being presented to the group, was 
represented infrequently in this study. Often a group member may be 
aware of something which would cast doubt on their personally preferred 
position. In order to maintain group consensus with their preferred 
alternative, the information is not shared within the group. Mindguarding 
was recorded infrequently when scored from observational data. 
However in the issue questionnaire, two members of group one reported 
withholding information from the group. This was the same frequency as 
within group three. No members of group two reported withholding 
knowledge. These results repeat the suggestion that cohesion has an 
optimal point on a curvilinear graph. Apparently the cohesion level of 
group three was too low to permit total honesty within the group. 
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4.2.4 Groupthink And The Literature 
The results of a symptom by symptom analysis of groupthink have 
previously shown empirical support for several symptoms of groupthink. 
It is now necessary to determine how the findings of this study relate to 
past literature. The main result of the present study was in opposition to 
Janis's (1982) assumption that high cohesion is a necessary prerequisite 
of groupthink (Callaway & Esser, 1984; Flowers, 1977; Tatlock et al., 
1992). Many previous authors have found results similar to those here, 
which suggest that in fact low cohesion produced more groupthink 
symptoms than did high cohesion (Leana, 1985; Longley & Pruitt, 1980; 
Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). This finding is by no means unusual and 
is more common in the literature than is support for cohesion. Those 
studies which do consider cohesion important are primarily case studies 
similar to those used by Janis (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Janis, 1986; 
Macauley, 1989; Moorhead, Ference & Neck, 1991; Smith, 1984). 
This finding has been a cause of concern amongst researchers. 
The end result has been that only cases which at first glance appear to 
suffer from groupthink have been investigated further (Neck & Moorhead, 
1992). The selection of events for study using the groupthink framework, 
has been based on the initial impression of the researcher. Research 
attention has been directed towards events which the researcher has 
already concluded fit the model. The result has been a mass of studies 
designed to confirm the authors first impressions regarding an event, 
rather than objective empirical studies. There does not appear to be any 
case studies of groupthink which have not supported the theory. 
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4.3 Issue Effect 
The effect of the discussion topic on groupthink was not as 
conclusive as was the effect of cohesion. A comparison of the results for 
group one and group two finds no difference in the occurrence of 
groupthink symptoms by session. Topic alone has not had an effect on 
the occurrence of groupthink symptoms. However, these results are 
assessed by group this finding changes. As in Kerr (1992), the High 
Cohesion Group in the present study came to an agreement more easily 
than did the Low Cohesion Group, with agreement measured by the 
length of the discussion sessions. 
4.3.1 Research On Issue Importance 
Bulk funding was a topic relevant to all of the subjects, and was 
discussed at length by both groups. Abortion was also discussed for a 
greater length of time than most other topics. A reason for this was the 
moral dilemmas it created for the subjects. Therefore, support was found 
for previous findings that personally relevant or controversial topics 
received greater attention than did irrelevant topics. 
The abortion topic was obviously important to many of the group 
members, as at least one group member disclosed personal information 
regarding the topic in each group. In most cases (14 out of 15 subjects) 
the subjects reported previously discussing this issue with others. Also 
supported here was the suggestion that a newly formed group would 
address task demands before social requirements when placed under 
time constraints (Shure et al., 1962). Although group two increased its off 
task behaviour for session five, this increase did not correspond with the 
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time taken to reach agreement or the number of written comments 
created. This suggests that the initial impression that group two 
increased its off task behaviour is untrue in terms of percentage time off 
task. 
4.4 Contributions And Limitations Of The Present 
Study 
The present study has addressed several of the defects of previous 
research. Firstly, the present methodology involved the selection of an 
existing cohesive group that met the strict requirements of cohesion as 
laid down by Janis (1982). By using a group which fitted Janis's 
definition of cohesion, his theory could be empirically tested with 
accuracy. The groups may not have had a political or business 
orientation, but Janis did claim that groupthink would apply outside of 
those fields. 
Secondly, the topics chosen for discussion were generated by the 
subjects themselves, so that the groups were discussing issues of 
relevance to them. This was considered preferable to the use of 
irrelevant business tasks. The group members discussed a topic with 
which they had experience, and this enabled a personally applicable 
discussion. 
Thirdly this study addressed an aspect of groupthink that has not 
been satisfactorily assessed previously, namely the discussion topic. The 
effect of the discussion topic was considered to have a potential influence 
on the occurrence of groupthink symptoms. The present findings create 
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concern regarding the quality of any decision made by individuals not 
directly affected by the outcome. 
A fourth factor that this study addressed was the measurement of 
both cohesion and groupthink. Cohesion was measured using two 
questionnaires designed from a selection of cohesion definitions. 
Groupthink was measured by studying the transcripts of group 
discussions, to search for statements that complimented Janis's (1982) 
definitions. In both instances, these measures were vastly superior to 
those used in previous research, and were able to provide more valid 
results than any other available measures. 
One limitation of the present study is that no generalisation of the 
results is possible. This is due to the presence of only one group in each 
of the high, low, and non cohesion conditions. This study will not stand 
out as a definitive work, but rather as a guide for further research. The 
study had originally been designed to include a greater number of 
groups, but obtaining groups which fitted the necessary criteria was 
extremely difficult. Groups which had a longer history than group one's 
eight months would also be preferable, if they were amenable to 
observation. 
The main methodological criticism of this study is that the groups 
were asked to make only a recommendation to a higher decision making 
authority. The instructions should have emphasised that the groups were 
to be the final decision making authority. However, the problem with this 
method is that the experimental condition would lose much of its realism. 
The alternative is to use a real political decision making group, which 
creates further technical difficulties. 
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Finally, in unison with other researchers, the present study used the 
averaging of individual measures to attain a group score for cohesion. 
Having criticised such methods, they can only be defended through the 
difficulties of using any other experimental measure. The only other way 
to create a valid measure of group cohesion would be to have the group 
as a unit decide their answers to the group questionnaire. Again, such 
methodology creates new problems. 
4.5 Recommendations For Future Study 
The main recommendations that arise from these results involve 
addressing the limitations of the present study. Firstly, the use of only 
one group per condition has limited the generalisability of the data. 
Although the findings proved significant in most cases, the sample sizes 
in future studies should be increased. A follow up study would therefore 
be a very large task indeed. 
Secondly, groups with a longer history, and a different background 
might provide different results to those obtained here. The subjects used 
here were mainly College of Education students, and a different type of 
subject may provide different results. A group with a longer history than 
eight months would also be preferable. However the group used here 
was sufficient. A further reason for this finding is that groups are dynamic 
and changeable. As such, it would be worth studying these groups for a 
longer period, to assess the changes that occurred over time. 
This leads to the third recommendation, which is that the dynamics 
within groups one and two were dependent on the study's longevity. 
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Under what circumstances would group two develop a cohesion score 
equal to that of group one? Would their productivity have been affected if 
they had? These questions and several others of a similar nature could 
have provided valuable data. 
Relationship dynamics between group members were also 
fascinating. However, due to the enormity of the task at hand, many 
qualitative group dynamic observations have been omitted from mention. 
These findings, such as one group member who spontaneously 
displayed devil's advocate behaviour, could be well worth addressing in 
future research. 
Alterations to the methodology used may also produce more 
substantial findings. For example, wording the instructions to firmly 
direct the subjects towards making the final decision on the issue is 
required. However, it must be noted that this would reduce the realism of 
the study unless the group members could realistically be expected to 
make such decisions under natural conditions. 
In summary, the recommended direction for future research is to 
follow the methods used here. An increase in subject or group numbers 
in each experimental condition, and the longevity of the study, are the two 
main alterations that need to be made to provide data whose results can 




The findings of this research do not support Janis's (1982) 
Groupthink model of cohesion. A reason for this was that the Low 
Cohesion Group experienced more symptoms of groupthink than the 
High Cohesion Group. 
Further more, this study found support for only four of Janis's 
groupthink symptoms. These symptoms were the rationalisation of 
negative information, stereotyping of outgroups, lack of inherent morality 
and the use of direct pressure upon group members. Significantly these 
behavioural symptoms occur with greater frequently in the Low Cohesion 
Group than the High Cohesion Group . 
The impact of the discussion topic on groupthink had no effect 
within this study. The actual number of groupthink symptoms did not 
change with the controversiality of the topic. Interestingly, participants 
generation of discussion topics resulted in longer periods of time spent 
on personally relevant topics. 
This study primarily supports Fisher's (1974) curvilinear model. His 
theory of an optimal level of cohesion to achieve maximum productivity 
provides an excellent explanation of these results. In addition Longley & 
Pruitt's (1980) concept of false cohesion figured predominantly with the 
low cohesion groups. This was in contrast to previous research which 
equated such a finding to high cohesion groups. 
Although Janis's (1982) key antecedent of cohesion was not 
supported in this study, this should not detract from the validity of his 
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theory. Ultimately the present findings should not be used for excessive 
generalisations, but they do suggest that four symptoms of Janis's (1982) 
groupthink model influence group decision quality. 
In summation, the current findings add to our knowledge of human 
behaviour. In particular, they highlight the relationship of individual 
interactions to the group decision making process. 
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Appendix 4 A. 
GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS 
(Group One's List} 
Associates on Section 
1 1 3 






Homosexual Law Reform 
PPTA join? 
Recycling within college 
P.A.R.S. 




Authoritarian teaching vs Liberatory techniques 
Does John produce clones? 
Christianity vs Antichrist 
Void 
Legalising marajuana 
End of World 
Euthanasia 
3rd World vs Western development resource use 
Teaching vs Learning 
Sexist issues 
Driftnet Fishing 
Torture pros and cons 
Appendix 4 B. 
GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS 





Socialising between tutor groups 
Socialising between divisions 
Selling alcohol on campus 




Organisation of section 
Have or not 




Poor associates (different standards) 
Japanese on campus 
Lecturers and tutor quality and consistency 
Department consistency 
Education policies 
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